KNOWING WHAT WORKS

Corporate Culture of GIZ

Corporate Strategic Evaluation – Main Report
Conducted by external evaluators commissioned by GIZ

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List of abbreviations

AIZ	Academy for International Cooperation
AMA	International staff seconded to partner countries
APLAK	Division of Asia, Pacific, Latin America and Carribean
BMU	Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CVF	Competing Values Framework
DED	German Development Service
EH	Development worker
EMZ	Division of Europe, Meditereanian, and Central Asia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FK	Manager with leadership function (Führungskraft)
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
IDA	Integrated Digital Applications
ICI	International Clima Initiative
IMA	Staff in headquarters (Germany)
InWent	Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH
MEB	Staff and development worker survey
NMA	National staff (in partner countries)
PMI	Project financed staff (in Germany)
RG	Reference Group (of this evaluation)
StS	Corporate Unit Evaluation
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPB	Theory of Planned Behaviour

Statement

Corporate Strategic Evaluations are conceived and conducted in the responsibility of the Evaluation Unit upon the decision of the Board of Directors. They address the need for decisions and change processes of the company, which can affect both service provision and corporate strategies. Corporate strategic evaluations serve to support evidence-based decisions, organizational learning and accountability. The use of the evaluation results is promoted by focusing on the interests, the need for information and the implementation capacities of the actors involved in the conception. Among other things, this is ensured via reference groups in which central stakeholders accompany the evaluation process.

In July 2018, GIZ's Evaluation Unit commissioned a consortium consisting of Mainlevel AG and Como Consult GmbH to coduct a strategic evaluation on the topic of "GIZ's corporate culture".

Corporate culture is an important key to corporate success and employee loyalty. It comprises the universe of shared values and norms that determine or shape the decisions, actions and behaviour of members of an organisation. This evaluation was the first comprehensive analysis of GIZ's corporate culture. The evaluation was intended to provide insights to better understand GIZ's corporate culture and assess its significance for change processes. In addition, recommendations were to be formulated as to what extent culture-shaping measures could contribute to GIZ's future viability and what could be starting points for such measures.

Methodologically, two theory-based approaches from psychology and sociology were interlinked in this evaluation, which have been tested empirically in numerous organisations, countries and cultural regions and which enjoy a high scientific reputation: the Competing Value Framework (CVF) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Qualitative and quantitative surveys were conducted for both theoretical approaches. Using the CVF, the four dimensions established in corporate culture research - cooperation, competition, creativity and control - were used to determine the culturally relevant guidelines set by GIZ, how its employees perceive the corporate culture (ACTUAL culture) and how they would like it to be (TARGET culture). Since the culture of many companies and institutions had already been examined using this approach, the results of GIZ could be compared with their average values. The TPB then provided the theoretical basis to explain the discrepancies between perceived and desired culture. To better understand why GIZ employees do not behave according to their desired culture, the main factors influencing the behaviour of GIZ employees were identified. Finally, options for action and recommendations were derived based on evidence.

Every GIZ employee in Germany and abroad as well as all development workers were given the opportunity to take part in two online surveys. Participants for interviews with managers and for a total of 30 focus group discussions with different function groups in Germany and abroad were randomly selected. This ensured that a broad spectrum of perspectives was covered. In addition, interested colleagues were able to participate in a discussion in the IDA community on this evaluation.

Thanks to the scientifically sound approach and broad stakeholder participation, this evaluation has delivered very valid results. From GIZ's point of view, the evaluation was methodologically sound as well as flexible and tailored to the needs of the project. Already during the process, interim results generated great interest in various organisational units.

The report is a product of the commissioned external evaluators. The recommendations of the team of experts (see chapter 4), which are addressed in the following management response, refer to the overall GIZ corporate culture. At the same time, the analyses within the framework of this evaluation have provided a large number of concrete starting points as to which factors influence the behaviour of members of different functional groups in

Germany and abroad; on this basis the experts have developed a broad range of empirically sound action points (see chapter 3). Especially managers, who according to the results of the evaluation play an important role in shaping corporate culture, can find suggestions for a wide variety of applications.

Management Response

The following management response provides information on the extent to which GIZ management shares the recommendations of the evaluation team and how their relevance and usefulness are assessed. For the prioritised recommendations, the Evaluation Unit will coordinate a procedure for developing an implementation plan with culture-shaping organisational units and processes (e.g. human resources, process cooperation and leadership, focus projects of the corporate strategy 2020-22) already identified during the evaluation. The implementation of the measures is monitored by the Evaluation Unit.

Key results and their interpretation by the evaluation team

- The GIZ corporate culture assessed in the evaluation does not vary much across functional groups and locations.
- GIZ employees would like to see lower levels of the cultural dimensions of control and competition and higher levels of cooperation and creativity.
  - The evaluators* point out that there is no such thing as a "one size fits all" culture and that, per se, no cultural dimension is better or worse or more important or less important than another.
  - According to the evaluation team, the deviations between TARGET and ACTUAL in all four cultural dimensions are not unusual for a large international company like GIZ.
  - The team of experts does not see any immediate need for action from the discrepancies between the TARGET and ACTUAL values in the dimensions of cooperation and competition but recommends that the employees' desire for more cooperation and less competition should be considered. Options for action in this regard are provided in chapter 4 C.

- The perception of the ACTUAL culture in GIZ is comparable to that of a public institution. Although employees would like to see a lower level of control, the evaluation results also show that employees identify with GIZ as a federal enterprise and accept the need for accountability.
  - The team of experts therefore sees no urgent need for action here.

- Regarding creativity, the ACTUAL culture of GIZ is slightly above average compared to the values of 1000 companies surveyed using the same method. In contrast, creativity is strongly underrepresented in the TARGET culture specified by the company in documents; for example, creativity is hardly mentioned in the onboarding documents.
  - As GIZ operates in a constantly changing and highly competitive environment, the evaluation team suggests measures to increase the ACTUAL value in this cultural dimension, which is conducive for future adjustments and changes, as creativity is seen as an important prerequisite for the willingness to change.

- The behaviour of most GIZ employees is essentially shaped by their personal attitude. Equally important is the perceived behaviour control, i.e. the assessment of the employees whether they have the necessary competences and resources for the desired behaviour. However, the subjective norm, i.e. the opinion of people important to them, has only a minor influence on the overall behaviour of GIZ employees.

- Managers are important change agents and influence all the behavioural determinants of GIZ employees.
  - In the opinion of the evaluation team, managers can best shape the corporate culture by exemplifying the desired behaviour and providing their employees with the necessary skills and resources.

- With few exceptions, much-discussed topics, such as the problem of fixed-term contracts and a high workload, do not have a negative impact on the willingness of employees to act in accordance with the desired culture.

- The evaluation team points out that these factors, which were often mentioned as problematic in interviews and focus group discussions, can have other negative consequences that have not been investigated in this evaluation.

The direction in which GIZ's corporate culture should be shaped is essentially derived from the challenges the company will face in the future. In general, implementation measures should be designed with a view to the change processes that GIZ can expect in the medium term. Since the recommendations for action lie at different levels, decisions must be made on (1) what ACTUAL culture in the respective dimension should be aimed for in principle, and (2) what needs to be considered at the level of concrete measures in order to implement change processes in a culturally sensitive manner.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Focus on measures in the creativity dimension that aim at changing corporate culture

In order to successfully shape upcoming transformation projects and change processes, corporate culture should be fundamentally positive towards change. Empirical research has shown that companies that are highly creative are the most open to change and can manage necessary adjustments more easily.

The recommendation is accepted. Creativity is seen as a prerequisite for successful change. GIZ wants to strengthen the willingness of employees to change in order to be fit for the future. Employees should help to shape change processes. To do this, competencies must be built up, the willingness to take risks must be increased and the opportunities for taking on responsibility must be expanded. Appropriate measures should be taken to bring the ACTUAL culture in the cultural dimension of creativity closer to the desired TARGET culture and thus reduce the gap between ACTUAL and TARGET. A full achievement of the desired target culture is not necessarily the aim of the measures.

Recommendation 2: Support managers in their role as promoters of creativity and bearers of cultural change and hold them accountable

In order to change the organisational culture of companies like GIZ in a desired direction, it is necessary to start with the behaviour in the company. As the results of the second online survey show, GIZ managers have an important role to play. They can exemplify the desired behaviour and thus serve as role models.

The recommended course of action is generally accepted. Managers must take responsibility for enabling GIZ employees to work more creatively. In general, it must be clarified whether the managers in the company are already capable of assuming this role or how they can be empowered to do so. To this end, the selection procedures for managers are to be reviewed, the necessary competencies are to be described in concrete terms and operationalised for assessment.

Recommendation 3: Communicate the discrepancies in the four cultural dimensions and emphasize the importance of the creativity dimension for future change processes

Transparency and openness are cornerstones for the acceptance of changes in the company, and acceptance is a prerequisite for future changes in behaviour. The evaluation team recommends that the results of this evaluation be communicated in a broad and effective manner.

The recommendation is accepted. The dissemination of the evaluation results and the creation of acceptance for the prioritized recommendations are important. For this purpose, they must be communicated via suitable channels and with the correct formulation / statement. It should be noted that the word "cultural change" has a poten-

tially negative connotation and should not be used in the formulation of measures to implement the recommendations. Messages such as "We take up the wishes of the employees in order to become sustainable" make more sense than "We must change our culture...".

Recommendation 4: Identify stories to illustrate the desired corporate culture

Corporate culture is best communicated and illustrated by stories. This means that the values, the desired orientations and principles of behaviour meant to characterise the new organisational culture are communicated more clearly and remembered better through stories than in any other form.

The recommendation is accepted. Authentic positive stories to illustrate the desired ACTUAL culture should be identified, recorded and communicated within the company. It is important to start an open dialogue and to present the communication not only via the intranet. Employee questions, company goals and measures derived from the evaluation results should be discussed openly.

Recommendation 5: Develop a change architecture

The evaluation team recommends the formulation of clear goals for culture-changing processes and, based on this, the development of an architecture of change. The change architecture should provide the participants with clarity about the objective and the process leading to it. It should also enable those responsible to control the process with all its elements.
The following recommendations for action should be part of this change architecture. However, since the evaluators attach importance to these elements, they are listed below as specific recommendations:

- *Recommendation 5a: Develop a strategic action agenda*
  As part of the change architecture, the evaluation team recommends developing a strategic action agenda that describes the most important actions and behaviours to be implemented in the change process.
- *Recommendation 5b: Identify quick wins*
  Even if a long-term cultural change will only be possible with strategic measures, many scientific studies show that so-called quick wins are elementary for the motivation to start change processes and cultural change at all. The evaluation team therefore recommends identifying measures that can be implemented immediately and do not require too many resources.
- *Recommended 5c: Link with ongoing culture-building initiatives*
  This link should be twofold: on the one hand, the results of the evaluation should be incorporated into existing initiatives. On the other hand, the already running culture-relevant initiatives should inform the culture-changing process towards more creativity; in the best case, interconnections can be identified, and processes integrated with each other.

The recommendation is accepted in principle. It must, however, be further specified in the context of the implementation planning.

Recommendation 6: Consider the cultural fit in recruitment decisions

In addition to the above recommendations, which primarily address the existing workforce, a change in culture can also be reinforced by external impulses. This includes, for example, the recruitment of new employees*. In the literature, the term "hiring for cultural fit" is often used when the cultural fit of the applicant and the company is the focus of personnel selection decisions. It should be noted here that GIZ should not strive for a supplementary fit (similarity of the applicant to existing GIZ employees), but for a complementary fit.

The recommendation is accepted with reservations. Standardised psychological tests to determine cultural fit were used and abolished at GIZ many years ago. Introducing new tests is costly (selection/design of tests, co-determination by staff association). The evaluators point out that valid and empirically proven tests are available. However, the reference group tends to prefer the assessment of the cultural fit of the applicants through the selection interviews (especially the interviews with the psychologists). Likewise, the STEP procedure for the

selection of managers from salary band 6 onwards should be further developed with regard to the cultural fit and the responsibility of managers. The exact design must be discussed further in the context of implementation planning.

Evaluation report

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Acknowledgement

Corporate Culture of GIZ
Executive Summary

Evaluation topic and objectives

This Corporate Strategic Evaluation focuses on the corporate culture of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. Since the 1960s, scientific research, business and the public sector have been discussing the significance and influence of corporate and organizational culture for the long-term success of companies.

Corporate culture can be understood as the totality of the company's target and actual cultures. On the one hand, the TARGET cultures comprise the "culture-forming specifications of the company", which are expressed in corporate strategy documents such as the vision and mission or in guidelines and strategies. GIZ also has numerous other values and norms, which are laid down in the guidelines for employees and managers as well as in documents, guidelines and, last but not least, employment contracts. On the other hand, the TARGET cultures include the desired culture(s) from the employees' perspective, i.e. what the corporate culture should be like from the employees' point of view.

The evaluation is intended to provide insights that will help to better understand GIZ's corporate culture and assess its significance for change processes. In addition, recommendations are to be developed which will give GIZ orientation as to in which areas and with which measures the identified differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL cultures can be reduced. The objectives of the USE can be summarised as follows:

Methodological design

For the purpose of this evaluation, two theory-based approaches, which have been empirically proven in numerous organizations, countries and cultural regions and enjoy a high scientific reputation, were interlinked in an evaluation design: the Competing Value Framework (CVF) by Cameron & Quinn and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) by Ajzen.

Theoretical approach 1 — Competing Value Framework

Objectives
- Reconstruction of the TARGET culture
- Description of the ACTUAL cultures
- Identification of differences between TARGET and ACTUAL culture

Theoretical approach 2 — Theory of Planned Behaviour

Objectives
- Analysis of the causes of the differences between TARGET and ACTUAL culture
- Deduction of recommendations for dealing with these differences

CVF: No approach has ever been used so comprehensively in capturing an organisational culture as the CVF approach. It is based on the assumption that values cannot be combined at will and that the preference for one value leads to the neglect or even rejection of other values. Intensive research led to the insight that there are four values that are expressed primarily in organisations and that can be linked to four types of culture: Co-operation (clan culture), creativity (adhocracy), competition (market culture) and control (hierarchy culture). With the help of the CVF, it was possible to show to which type of culture the GIZ employees belong and in which of the dimensions they would like to see a change in relation to the perceived corporate culture.

Objective 1	The TARGET-culture of the GIZ is reconstructed.
Objective 2	Essential aspects of the different ACTUAL cultures of GIZ are presented.
Objective 3	Differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL cultures of GIZ are identified.
Objective 4	The TARGET/ACTUAL differences are analysed with regard to possible conflicts and their relevance for the performance of GIZ and the implementation of change processes.
Objective 5	Recommendations for dealing with the TARGET-ACTUAL differences are derived.

TPB: In recent decades, TPB has established itself as the dominant framework for explaining and predicting behaviour in company-wide (reform) processes. With the help of this theory, the main factors influencing the behaviour of GIZ employees could be identified and recommendations for action could be derived based on evidence.

In this evaluation a robust scientific approach to data collection was followed, with qualitative (17 interviews and 30 focus group discussions worldwide) and quantitative methods (two online surveys - complete surveys). The evaluation used the following methodological triangulation:

Collected data	Method of data collection/ sampling	Method of data analysis
Information about the TARGET culture	Document analysis, criteria-based selection	Qualitative and quantitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture by managers	Qualitative interviews with selected GIZ managers using the CVF	Qualitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture by employees and EH	Quantitative online survey, complete survey	Quantitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Information about the origins of the differences between TARGET and ACTUAL culture	Focus group discussions with selected groups of employees at different locations based on the TPB	Qualitative analysis along the constructs of the TPB
Information about the intention of employees to act according to the TARGET culture	Quantitative online survey based on the TPB, full sample	Identification of items for second online survey (using the TPB)

Results

Only selected results are presented below.

Part A: What characterises the GIZ culture and its actors?

Part A describes how the GIZ cultures present themselves, where the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture lie and how the behaviour pattern of GIZ employees is fundamentally shaped. Part A is therefore a description of the current situation:

In all four cultural dimensions there are medium to strong discrepancies between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture.

GIZ employees would like to see lower levels of the cultural dimensions of control and competition and higher levels of cooperation and creativity.

The perceptions of the ACTUAL culture at GIZ are comparable to the ACTUAL characteristics of a public administration. At the same time, there is a high acceptance of GIZ as a federal enterprise and the associated framework conditions, a high level of identification with GIZ and a pronounced desire to enhance the reputation of GIZ.

Managers and employees perceive the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ very similarly.

The TARGET culture of GIZ, as depicted in the corporate strategy documents, differs strongly from the TARGET perception of employees and managers.

A comparison of these TARGET cultures reveals a similar picture in the cultural dimensions of cooperation and competition. However, the TARGET culture from the documents clearly differs in the dimensions creativity (undervalued) and control (overvalued).

Overall, there are only slight differences in the perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ between the different function groups and between regions.

Radar chart:

- Cooperate: 31 / 34 / 36
- Create: 28 / 31 / 9
- Compete: 18 / 16 / 22
- Control: 23 / 20 / 33

Legend:
— TARGET - surveys
— TARGET - interviews
— TARGET - documents

Part B: What influences the behaviour of GIZ employees and what does not?

General

The behaviour of most GIZ employees is determined above all by whether they expect positive consequences from their actions (personal attitude) and by whether they feel empowered (perceived behaviour control).

Personal attitude — Great influence on all dimensions
Subjective norm — Great influence only on competitiveness and control
Perceived control of behaviour — Great influence on all dimensions
→ Intention
R^2 varies between 23%-65%

The subjective norm, i.e. the perception of GIZ employees of the extent to which the opinions of people important to them influence their behaviour, plays a subordinate role in the overall result for the behaviour of GIZ employees. The coefficient of agreement (R2) in the second online survey varies for the entire model between 23% and 65%, i.e. up to 65% of the behaviour in GIZ can be explained by the TPB alone.

With few exceptions, the uncertainty about continued employment (e.g. fixed-term contracts) and the perceived need to be visible in the company have hardly any influence on the behaviour to bring about a change in the discrepancy between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture.

Managers have a strong influence on the corporate culture and influence all the determinants of behaviour of a GIZ employee.

Even a heavy workload, with few exceptions, has no effect on the behaviour of bringing about a change in the discrepancy between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture.

Personal attitude ("I benefit from it"): Decisions between different action alternatives are based on the expectation that behaviour has an individual consequence on the one hand and on the subjective evaluation of this consequence on the other.

Subjective norm ("the opinion of others is important to me"): the subjectively perceived social consequences of behaviour. On the one hand it is about how other important people see the behaviour in question (social norms) and on the other hand about the willingness to comply with the wishes of these other people.

Perceived behaviour control ("I feel empowered"): The ease with which the behaviour can be carried out according to the conviction of the person concerned. It represents a person's opinion of how easy or difficult the behaviour is likely to be executed.

Cooperation

All in all, management, appreciation of values, freedom of decision and career wishes have the greatest influence on cooperation in GIZ. They have an effect above all through personal attitude and perceived behaviour control.

H1	High workload
H2	Competition for resources
H3	Visibility
H4	Career aspirations
H5	Focus on standardized processes
H6	Rules for collaboration across units
H7	Mobile working
H8	Digital tools / software
H9	Appreciation
H10	Same development potentialities
H11	Manager
H12	Intern decision-making processes
H13	Freedom of choice
H14	Clear responsibilities and interfaces
H15	Reward
H16	Different department / divisional interests
H17	Frequent staff changes
H18	Uncertainties about continued employment
H19	Own network in the company

Weak effect
Important effect
Very strong effect

Personal attitude → Collaboration
Perceived control of behaviour → Collaboration

Internal competition

Individual targets and equal opportunities for development are the strongest support for internal competitive behaviour. Both have an effect through personal attitude and subjective norms, which are also the most important behavioural determinants in this study.

H1	High workload
H2	Competition for resources
H3	Visibility
H4	Career aspirations
H5	Frequent staff changes
H6	Individual goals
H7	Team goals
H8	Equal development opportunities
H9	Appreciation of high quality work
H10	Improvement of reputation
H11	Goodwill of partners
H12	Good working conditions
H13	Uncertainties about continued employment

Weak effect
Important effect
Very strong effect

Personal attitude / Subjective norm / Perceived control of behaviour → Internal competition

External competition

Career aspirations promote external competitive behaviour most strongly; they have an effect on all three behaviour determinants and are most effective through personal attitude.

Creativity

The strongest influence on creative action is exerted by managers and the degree of personal freedom of decision; primarily through personal attitude and perceived behavioural control.

Use of standardised guidelines (control)

Justified rules and the control of individual work steps by the manager have the strongest influence on the use of standardised guidelines, in both cases decisively via the personal attitude.

Compliance with rules (control)

Identification with GIZ has the strongest influence on whether employees develop the intention to follow rules through their personal attitude.

Part C: What options does GIZ have?

In the following, GIZ's options for reducing the discrepancies between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture are presented. The listing of these options does not mean that GIZ has not yet taken any measures. At this point, the evaluation team does not yet make any recommendations for action. Due to the heterogeneity of the results obtained in the respective function groups and the importance of managers in GIZ, options are listed that have the potential to reduce the discrepancies between TARGET and ACTUAL in the respective function groups on the one hand and among employees with personnel responsibility on the other.

Cooperation

Behaviour is shaped by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control.

AMA, IMA and NMA	• Giving more freedom of decision • Managers could demand more cooperation
PMI	• Encourage more mobile working • Managers could demand more cooperation
EH	• Managers could demand more cooperation (also subjective norm)
MA with personnel responsibility	• Giving more freedom of decision • Managers could demand more cooperation • Provision of digital tools

Internal and external competition

Behaviour in relation to internal competition is characterised by personal attitude and subjective norm. Behaviour in relation to external competition is additionally influenced by perceived behaviour control.

AMA	• More appreciation regarding the service provided (→ less competitive behaviour)
IMA, NMA	• Creating equal development opportunities (→ more competitive behaviour)
PMI	• Setting individual goals • Measures that enhance the reputation of GIZ (→more competitive behaviour)
EH	• Measures that enhance the reputation of GIZ (→more competitive behaviour) • Measures that make it easier for EH to win the favour of partners (→more competitive behaviour)
MA with personnel responsibility	• Setting individual goals • Creating equal development opportunities (→more competitive behaviour)

Creativity

The behaviour is characterized by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control.

AMA, NMA	• Giving more freedom of decision • Managers could demand more creative work
IMA, PMI	• Managers could demand more cooperation
EH	• Promise a reward • Provide digital tools
MA with personnel responsibility	• Giving more freedom of decision • Managers could demand more creative work

Use of standardised guidelines (control)

Behaviour is characterised by personal attitude, subjective norm and perceived behaviour control.

AMA, NMA	• Clearer and more transparent formulation of the rules
NMA	• Measures that increase identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise
IMA	• Provide digital tools
PMI	• Measures that increase the acceptance of accountability
EH	• Stronger justification of the rules • Overview of the main sources of information • Managers could demand this more • Measures that increase identification with the GIZ
MA with personnel responsibility	• Stronger justification of the rules • Managers could demand this more

Follow rules (control)

Behaviour is characterised by personal attitude, subjective norm and perceived behaviour control.

AMA, NMA, IMA, PMI and EH	• Overview of the main sources of information • Measures that increase the acceptance of accountability
MA with personnel responsibility	• Overview of the main sources of information • Measures that increase identification with the GIZ

Interpretation of the results and recommendations

Basically: There is not one superior cultural expression ("one size fits all" culture). No cultural dimension is better or worse or less important than another. Strengths and weaknesses have to be recognized and brought to consciousness.

The results show medium to strong deviations in all four cultural dimensions. These deviations are not unusual - especially for large and multinational companies - and

can be explained and classified very well in view of the special environment of GIZ. These results confirm previous scientific findings: according to the empirical state of research, more mature companies, such as GIZ, tend to have stronger characteristics in the dimensions control and competition (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

The above-average ACTUAL values of GIZ in control can also be explained by the accountability of a federal company. Although employees would like to see lower values in this dimension, the results of the second online survey show that employees identify with GIZ and accept the accountability obligations in principle. The evaluation team therefore sees no urgent need for action here.

The strong discrepancy between the TARGET and ACTUAL values in the dimensions of cooperation and competition can be assessed against the results of other companies. A comparison with average values of 1000 companies shows that the ACTUAL values of GIZ are at a similarly high level in the areas of cooperation and competition. Although there is no immediate need for action based on these results, the wishes of the employees should be considered. Options for doing so can be found in the results chapter in Part C.

GIZ even shows slightly higher scores for creativity compared to the average of 1000 companies. However, since GIZ is operating in a constantly changing and very competitive environment, measures to increase the ACTUAL value in this dimension for future adjustments and changes seem to make sense.

☑ **Recommendation 1: Focus on measures in the creativity dimension that aim to change the corporate culture:** In order to successfully design upcoming transformation projects and change processes, corporate culture should be fundamentally positive towards change. Empirical research has shown that companies that are highly creative are the most open to change and can manage necessary adjustments more easily.

☑ **Recommendation 2: Support managers in their role as promoters of creativity and bearers of cultural change and hold them accountable**: In order to change the organisational culture of companies like GIZ in a desired direction, it is necessary to start with the behaviour in the company. As the results of the second online survey show, GIZ managers have an important role to play. They can exemplify the desired behaviour and thus serve as role models.

☑ **Recommendation 3: Communicate the discrepancies in the four cultural dimensions and emphasize the importance of the creativity dimension for future change processes:**

Transparency and openness are cornerstones for the acceptance of changes in the company, and

acceptance is a prerequisite for future changes in behaviour. The evaluation team recommends that the results of this evaluation be communicated in a broad and effective way.

☑ **Recommendation 4: Identify stories to illustrate the desired corporate culture:** Corporate culture is best communicated and illustrated by stories. This means that the values, the desired orientations and principles of behaviour meant to characterise the new organisational culture are communicated more clearly and remembered better through stories than in any other form.

☑ **Recommendation 5: Develop an architecture of change:** The evaluation team recommends the formulation of a clear goal for the culture-changing process and, based on this, the development of an architecture of change. The change architecture should provide clarity to the participants about the objective and the process leading to it. It should also enable those responsible to control the process with all its elements.

The following recommendations should be part of this change architecture. However, since the evaluators attach particular importance to these elements, they are listed below as specific recommendations:

☑ *Recommendation 5a: Develop a strategic action agenda: As part of the change architecture, the evaluation team recommends developing a strategic action agenda that describes the most important actions and behaviours to be implemented in the change process.*

☑ *Recommendation 5b: Identify quick wins: Even if a long-term cultural change will only be possible with strategic measures, many scientific studies show that so-called quick wins are elementary for the motivation to start change processes and cultural change at all. The evaluation team therefore recommends identifying measures that can be implemented immediately and do not require too many resources.*

☑ *Recommendation 5c: Link with ongoing culture-building initiatives: This link should be twofold: On the one hand, the results of the evaluation should be incorporated into existing initiatives. On the other hand, the already running culture-relevant initiatives should inform the culture-changing process towards more creativity; in the best case, interconnections can be identified, and processes integrated with each other.*

☑ *Recommendation 6: Consider the cultural fit in recruitment decisions: In addition to the above recommendations, which primarily address the*

existing workforce, a change in culture can also be reinforced by external impulses. This includes, for example, the recruitment of new employees*. In the literature, the term "hiring for cultural fit" is often used when the cultural fit of the applicant and the company is the focus of personnel selection decisions. It should be noted here that GIZ should not strive for a supplementary fit (similarity of the applicant to existing GIZ employees), but for a complementary fit.

Evaluation topic, objectives and questions

1.1 Evaluation topic

This Corporate Strategic Evaluation focuses on the corporate culture of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. Since the 1960s, the importance and influence of corporate and organisational culture has been discussed in scientific research, in business and in the public sector. The term corporate culture[1] is defined in different ways.

The understanding of corporate culture that emerges from the Terms of Reference (TOR) of this evaluation summarises many of the aspects mentioned in different definitions: According to this, "[corporate culture] can be understood as a set of shared values, norms, attitudes and habits that determine or shape the decisions, actions and behaviour of members of the organisation" (GIZ 2018: 3). Edgar Schein, one of the founders of organizational psychology and organizational development, also emphasizes that organizational culture is learned together when a group adapts to the challenges of its environment and integrates them within. It is the result of a shared learning experience in dealing with problems and as such is passed on to new members of the organisation (cf. Schein 1985: 25).

Furthermore, the corporate culture can be understood as the totality of the company's target and actual cultures[2]. The TARGET cultures include, on the one hand, the "culture forming specifications of the company" (GIZ 2018: 3), which are expressed in corporate strategy documents - such as the vision and mission or in guidelines and strategies. GIZ also has numerous other values and norms, which are laid down in the guidelines for employees and managers as well as in documents, guidelines and employment contracts. On the other hand, the TARGET cultures encompass the desired culture(s) from the employees' perspective, i.e. how employees want the culture of the company to be.

In contrast, the term ACTUAL culture refers to the way these guidelines are used, or the culture(s) actually lived in the company. The TARGET and ACTUAL cultures influence each other, although the two are not necessarily congruent. Rather, the individual is also guided in his or her actions by his or her personal attitudes and value orientation[3]. Personal values are also shaped by the cultural context in which a person lives and works. Thus, a network of interactions emerges in which, on the one hand, the TARGET and ACTUAL culture have a reciprocal effect on each other and, on the other hand, the persons and the culture "surrounding" them influence each other. The evaluation topic is not limited to individual persons, hierarchical levels or locations, but concerns the entire company.

1.2 Evaluation objectives and use of evaluation results

In the above-mentioned scientific and practical debate on corporate culture, it is assumed that the success of an organisation is linked to its culture and can be influenced accordingly - by modifying the organisational culture. Within the framework of this evaluation, organizational culture was assessed as a success factor, especially regarding its ability to promote change processes.

Since the 1990s, GIZ and its predecessor organisations have undergone numerous changes, some of them

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[1] The terms organisational culture and corporate culture are used synonymously in the following.

[2] Organizations often have several target and actual cultures. When in the following we speak of "target and actual culture" in the singular for linguistic reasons, this term also includes possible other existing target and actual cultures

[3] Cf. Schein's 3-level culture model. It is assumed that visible actions are an expression of non-visible attitudes and value orientations. The latter are more difficult to change than the obvious actions (see Schein 1985).

far-reaching. This has involved questions such as how decentralised GIZ should be organised and how market and customer orientation can go hand in hand with normative development of policy attitudes. The merger of the German Development Service (DED), Capacity Building International, Germany (InWent) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH in 2011 was followed by other change processes such as bauhaus15 and Digital Leadership, some of which are still being implemented.

As with all change processes, the above-mentioned projects also caused friction at various points, due to side effects and because not everyone shared the respective needs for change and the decisions made.

Interviews with GIZ executives led to the assumption that some of these disgruntlements are still present. It was also occasionally assumed that the target and actual culture were in imbalance and that this could have a negative effect on the company's ability to change. The 2019 Employee and Development Service Survey (MEB), on the other hand, shows a substantial improvement on 2016 regarding the question of corporate culture.

Similarly, the hypothesis existed that the guidelines and ideas that make up the target culture differed and that there were therefore several target cultures. These assumptions were flanked by the desire of the management level to create greater harmony between the ideas of the employees and the guidelines of the management level in order to reduce friction losses and possible areas of conflict.

Against this background, the board of directors of GIZ has commissioned this evaluation. It is intended to provide insights that will help to better understand GIZ's corporate culture and evaluate its significance for change processes. The objectives of the evaluation can be summarised as follows:

Table 1: Evaluation objectives

Objective1	The TARGET culture of GIZ is reconstructed.
Objective 2	Essential aspects of the different ACTUAL cultures of GIZ are presented.
Objective 3	Differences between TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ are identified.
Objective 4	The target/actual differences are analysed regarding potential conflicts and their relevance for the performance of GIZ and the implementation of change processes.
Objective 5	Recommendations for dealing with the TARGET-ACTUAL differences are derived.

The target group of the evaluation of corporate culture are all GIZ employees and development workers. A deep understanding of the GIZ corporate culture is particularly important for GIZ managers. It allows them to think about the corporate culture as a success factor in management decisions and to make decisions in such a way that they can be implemented in the light of the corporate culture.
Other stakeholders of the evaluation are the GIZ board of directors (as the client) as well as the reference group (RG) and the evaluation unit (StS). The latter advise the Board of Directors on content and methodology; StS also provided operational support to the evaluation team. The evaluation of corporate culture was conducted by a consortium of the consulting firms Mainlevel Consulting AG and Como Consult GmbH.

1.3 Evaluation questions

In accordance with the evaluation objectives and the users' interests explained above, this evaluation primarily analysed the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ and assessed them in terms of their significance for the success of change processes in the company. In order to answer this core question,

various analytic steps were necessary. All evaluation questions can be categorised into the three topics 1) TARGET and 2) ACTUAL culture and 3) Comparison between TARGET and ACTUAL culture. The evaluation questions from the TOR (cf. GIZ 2018: 7f) were adapted by the evaluation team according to the evaluation objectives and the methodological design (see Chapter 4). They are listed below.

Table 2: Evaluation questions

Topics	Evaluation questions of the evaluation of corporate culture

TARGET Culture	1. What does the TARGET culture of GIZ look like?
	   1.1. Which culture-forming values does the company mention in strategic documents or guidelines?
	   1.2. What cultural values does the GIZ management represent?
	   1.3. What is the TARGET culture of GIZ staff and development workers?
	   1.4. To what extent are the values and standards set by GIZ suitable to support the visions and strategies of GIZ?

	2. To what extent are there differences and conflicting goals between and within the culture-building specifications in documents (1.1.), the perception of the TARGET culture by GIZ management (1.2.) and the perception by GIZ employees (1.3.)?

ACTUAL Culture	3. What do the ACTUAL cultures of GIZ look like?
	   3.1. Which values, norms, expectations and attitudes guide the actions of GIZ employees?
	   3.2. How does the GIZ management level perceive the ACTUAL cultures?

	4. To what extent exist differences and conflicting goals between and within the ACTUAL cultures lived by GIZ employees and the perception of ACTUAL cultures by GIZ management? 5. To what extent exist differences between the identified ACTUAL cultures of GIZ?
Comparison target* and actual culture **SET = present culture + desired culture**	6. To what extent exist differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ? 7. What are the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ? 8. To what extent can the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture be perceived as promoting or hindering processes of change in GIZ? 9. How can the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture be dealt with?

Literature and portfolio overview

The debate about the importance and influence of organizational culture goes back to the 1960s (see e.g. Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2015; Katzenbach, Steffen and Kronley, 2012; Lorsch and McTague, 2016). There are now numerous approaches and a total of over 4600 published studies that deal with the definition and assessment of organizational and corporate culture. To date, a standardized and comprehensive approach to understand and assess organizational culture has not yet been developed which could identify the causes of cultural differences in groups, organizations and countries, their psychological basis and their effects on people and organizations. Depending on the context, objectives, actors and countries, existing approaches to assess organizational culture have different strengths and weaknesses. The choice of approaches ultimately depends on the envisaged utilization of the findings. In addition, there have been debates among cultural scientists for decades as to whether the approaches should be qualitative or quantitative in nature.

On the one hand, there are those who claim that cultures are unique and inherently subjective and can only be understood through deep immersion. Proponents of qualitative approaches argue that implicit or unconscious beliefs can only be perceived by a sentient observer with exceptional sensitivity and over a long period of observation (see Geertz, 1983). Standardized surveys were therefore the wrong way to investigate organizational culture because they would not be able to capture implicit beliefs and assumptions or to gain a precise understanding of existing rituals and symbols (cf. Alvesson and Berg, 1992; Martin, 2002; Smircich, 1983). According to this view, each organizational culture is considered unique and cannot be compared with others.

On the other hand, functionalist approaches to assess corporate culture are advocated, according to which culture is something that an organization has and not something that an organization is. Using quantitative tools, these approaches attempt to capture organizational culture through the values and norms that guide the behaviour, thinking and feeling of the organization's members (see, for example, Barsade and O'Neill, 2014; Harrison and Carroll, 2006; Lauver and Kristof-Brown, 2001; O'Reilly and Chat-man, 1996). In contrast to qualitative approaches, which emphasize the uniqueness of each organization, the functionalist perspective focuses on how culture influences both individual and organizational behaviour and how common cultural features can be compared across organizations.

Methodological design

3.1 Introduction

In order to give enough space to the results of this evaluation, the evaluation team, together with the Evaluation Unit, decided to keep the description of the methodological approach brief in the main report. More detailed information on the methodology and on the individual steps in the data collection process can be found in the Inception Report.

The evaluation is based on the assumption that the values and norms that the company prescribes and the values and norms that guide the behaviour of GIZ employees can be described and that the target and actual culture of GIZ can thus be recorded. It was also assumed that value-driven behaviour is not individual or unique, but collective. Thus, groups of employees were identified in the evaluation who share similar values and norms - rather than researching the behaviour of individual employees. Against this background, the evaluation was conducted from a functionalist perspective.

From the wide range of approaches to the study of corporate culture, the evaluation team, in consultation with the Evaluation Unit, decided to use the Competing Values Framework (CVF). As displayed in figure 1, this approach is supplemented by a second one: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). The combination of these two approaches made it possible not only to comprehensively capture the target and actual cultures of GIZ and identify differences between target and actual, but also to investigate the causes of any target/actual differences.

Given the context of the evaluation and the evaluation objectives, the evaluation faced various challenges. GIZ's corporate culture includes GIZ employees at all hierarchical levels and locations. Therefore, the evaluation raised expectations as well as concerns at all levels. For this reason, a robust, theory-based evaluation approach was chosen to achieve reliable results. In addition, it allowed to include many different cultural areas and to easily repeat the surveys in the future if necessary[4]. Furthermore, this approach was selected to comply with a high level of expectations and demand for justification, and to promote the acceptance of the evaluation. For the same reason, it was necessary to continuously involve managers and employees in the evaluation and to regularly inform them about the progress of the evaluation.

3.2 Evaluation approaches

For the purposes of this evaluation, two theory-based approaches, which have been empirically proven in numerous organizations, countries and cultural areas and enjoy a high scientific reputation, were interlinked in an evaluation design: The CVF and the TPB.

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[4] Corporate culture and cooperation are already explicitly part of the MDBs. Additional questions from the CVF have also been included in the MEB 2019.

Figure 1: Theoretical evaluation approaches of evaluation

This evaluation design combined robust approaches from sociology and psychology in an innovative way. It satisfied high scientific demands and made it possible to integrate different cultural areas (country cultures, groups of employees, previous experiences of employees). The models also allow a future review of the corporate culture after some years, thus ensuring a high degree of comparability.

3.3 Competing Values Framework

No approach has been applied as comprehensively as the Competing Values Framework (CVF). The CVF was developed by the two cultural experts Kim Cameron and Robert Quinn (see Cameron and Quinn, 2011). It is based on the assumption that values cannot be combined at will and that the preference for one value leads to the neglect or even rejection of other values.

Intensive research led to the insight that there are four values that are expressed primarily in organizations and that can be linked to four types of culture: Cooperation (clan culture), creativity (adhocracy), competition (market culture) and control (hierarchy culture). These four types of companies can be separated in a four-field scheme by two empirically derived dimensions: the company focus (either inward or outward) and the organizational structure (either flexible or controlled/stable). The four culture types (clan, adhocracy, market and hierarchy) and the values assigned to them compete among each other, i.e. it is not possible to find a strong adhocracy culture and a strong hierarchical culture in a company at the same time.

The following table summarizes the most important characteristics of the CVF:

Table 3: Summary of the main characteristics of the four CVF crop types

	Clan (Cooperation)	Adhocracy (Creativity)	Hierarchy (Control)	Market (competition)
Focus	inward-facing	outward looking	inward-facing	outward looking
Organisational structure	flexible	flexible	controlled and stable	controlled and stable
Basic assumption: Employees work best when they…	… trust the organization, be loyal to it and feel as a part of it.	… understand the meaning and purpose of their tasks.	… take on clear roles and let work processes be determined by rules and regulations.	… have clear goals and are paid according to their success.
Values	Attachment, affiliation, cooperation, trust, support	Growth, stimulation, versatility, independence, attention to detail	Communication, routine, formalization, consistency	Communication, competition, competence, performance
Conduct	Working in a team, participating, employee loyalty is emphasized	creative, not afraid of risks, adaptable	compliant and predictable	target-oriented, planned, task- and competition-oriented, information on customers and competitors is collected

3.4 Theory of Planned Behaviour

Since GIZ also attached great importance to analysing the differences between the TARGET and the ACTUAL culture and to recommendations for dealing with these differences, it was decided to integrate a behavioural science model into the evaluation design in addition to the CVF. Therefore, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) was added to the evaluation design as a methodological supplement.

The TPB was developed in the 1990s by Icek Ajzen and has established itself in recent decades as the dominant framework for explaining and predicting behaviour in company-wide (reform) processes (cf. Ajzen, 1991). It is a behavioural theory that has been tested many times and has been used in numerous contexts, countries and cultural areas. It deals with the extent to which one can predict and explain a person's behaviour towards, for example, a rule or norm, if one knows what the person's attitude towards this rule/norm is and if one also understands what influences the person's attitude. With this knowledge, managers can be enabled to successfully promote change processes, for example as important change agents. According to this theory, the intention (behavioural intention) is the best determinant of behaviour (predictor). The intention is in turn influenced by three factors: 1. attitude towards behaviour, 2. subjective norms, 3. perceived behaviour control. These are briefly explained in Table 4.

Table 4: Factors determining behavioural intent under the TPB

	1) Personal attitude towards behaviour	2) Subjective standards	3) Perceived behavioural control
A person will perform a behaviour if...	... she positively evaluates the behaviour and expected consequences.	... she believes that stakeholders or colleagues who are important to her would also positively evaluate this behaviour.	... the execution of the planned behaviour is not perceived as too difficult.

If the person evaluates all three determinants positively, there is a high probability that the behavioural intent is positive, and that the behaviour will be displayed.

3.5 Advantages and limitations of the selected approaches

The option of integrating two theory-based approaches into one evaluation design and conducting four scientifically based survey steps ensured robustevaluation results. In addition, the recommendations could also be derived based on evidence. The main advantages and limitations of the selected approaches are listed below (see Table 5).

Table 5: Advantages of CVF and TPB

Advantages of the CVF

- The most widely researched and validated approach to assessing organizational culture; it has been applied in more than 13,000 organizations worldwide and in academic research
- High level of standardisation and comparability with future evaluation results (this is not possible for approaches with open queries)
- Theoretically and scientifically derived culture types
- Approach to capture both the TARGET and ACTUAL culture
- Quantitative assessment of cultural values and option to prioritize attributes by distributing 100 points to the individual attributes within a culture type
- Dependencies of aspects are visible (in many approaches questions are asked in isolation - without dependencies)
- Intuitive presentation of the target/actual results and their differences

Limitations of the CVF

- CVF did not allow to deduce the reasons for differences between TARGET and ACTUAL. However, so far there is no cultural research approach that can robustly derive these reasons. Therefore, the TPB was added.
- CVF is not an approach to derive evidence-based recommendations for dealing with the differences. Again, there is no cultural research approach that allows this. Therefore, the TPB was added.

Advantages of the TPB

- Empirically robust behavioural theory that has been applied in numerous contexts, countries and cultural areas
- Robust identification of reasons for differences between target and actual
- Enables the derivation of evidence-based recommendations for dealing with target/actual differences
- Behavioural determinants of TPB were derived theoretically and scientifically
- High standardization through predefined and validated behavioural determinants and high comparability with future evaluation results

Limitations of the TPB

- The TPB is basically an individualistic theory. Therefore, a second online survey was necessary to obtain a large sample size which allowed to derive results that cover the whole company.

3.6 Implementation: Four evaluation survey steps

In this evaluation a robust scientific approach to data collection was followed, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The evaluation used the following methodological triangulation:

Table 6: Methods of data collection and data analysis

Collected data	Methodology of data collection/ sampling	Methodology of data evaluation
Information about the TARGET culture	Document analysis, criteria-based selection	Qualitative and quantitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture by managers	Qualitative interviews with selected GIZ managers using the CVF	Qualitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Perception of the target and actual culture by employees and management	Quantitative online survey, complete survey	Quantitative analysis along the culture values of the CVF
Information on the causes of the differences between target and actual culture	Focus groups with selected function groups of employees at various locations using the TPB	Qualitative analysis along the constructs of the TPB Identification of items for second online survey (with the TPB)
Information about the intention of the employees and development workers to act according to the TARGET culture	Quantitative online survey based on the TPB, complete survey	Quantitative analysis along the constructs of the TPB and the hypotheses identified in the FGD

The evaluation team followed a participatory approach in the implementation of the survey steps and informed the Evaluation Unit on a weekly basis about the progress made and discussed the further procedure. The cooperation between GIZ and evaluation team was based on an approach of agile project management methods.

The following figure shows the chronological sequence of the evaluation:

Period: September/October 2018	Period: October/November 2018	Period: March/April 2019	Period: June 2019
Qualitative Survey I	**Quantitative Survey I**	**Qualitative Survey II**	**Quantitative Investigation II**
✓ Assessment of culture-forming values in documents ✓ Assessment of the TARGET/ACTUAL cultures from the perspective of selected GIZ manager	✓ Assessment of the TARGET/ACTUAL cultures from the point of view of GIZ employees ✓ Differences between TARGET/TARGET, ACTUAL/ACTUAL and TARGET/ACTUAL	✓ Assessment of possible differences from the perspective of selected GIZ employees in Germany and abroad ✓ Obtaining information for development of the survey design based on the TPB	✓ Assessment of the reasons for differences between TARGET/TARGET, ACTUAL/ACTUAL and TARGET/ACTUAL ✓ Evidence-based recommendations

Figure 2: Survey phases of evaluation corporate culture

3.7 Document analysis

As part of the document analysis, secondary data on GIZ's corporate culture was evaluated in order to more precisely define and understand the object of the evaluation. In order to map the GIZ corporate culture as broadly as possible, it was decided, together with the evaluation unit, firstly to analyse selected written, company-wide communication to employees from the last five years. Secondly, documents were added which are distributed to newly hired GIZ employees as part of the onboarding in Germany. Thirdly, selected discussions on the intranet and fourthly, the GIZ website were evaluated.

The document analysis was conducted as part of the first evaluation step. The documents were analysed

based on the CVF's four cultural values, firstly "manually" by the evaluators* and secondly with the help of a specially developed crawler. This crawler is a computer program that searches the above-mentioned documents and websites for previously defined terms. For this purpose, the evaluation team distributed 100 percentage points to the cultural values - cooperation, creativity, competition and control - after intensive analysis of the documents.

3.8 Qualitative interviews with managers

The qualitative interviews, which also took place in the first step of the evaluation, served to capture the TARGET and ACTUAL culture from the perspective of selected GIZ managers. In addition, information was collected for the development of the subsequent online survey. The interviews included an open questioning of the values of the CVF.
A total of 17 interviews of 60 minutes each were conducted between September 14th to October 31st, 2018. When selecting the interview partners, all areas and staff units of the GIZ as well as the external structure were considered. Equally, attention was paid to include interview partners from different managerial levels. The random selection from the respective categories was conducted by the Evaluation Unit.

Table 7: Number of interviews per function group

Function group	Number Interviews
Management board	2
Divison managers (BL)	2
Staff position leaders (StSL)	2
Department managers (AL)	2
Group leaders (GL)	2
Country directors (LD)	4
Project managers (AV)	3
Total:	17

The interviews were conducted in person or via Skype or telephone, depending on the location of the interviewee. The interview guideline was based on the cultural values of the CVF, which were openly questioned in the interviews. In addition, it contained an open question for additional items not covered by the CVF. The analysis of the interviews was based on the most frequently mentioned cultural values of the CVF.

3.9 First online survey: Competing Values Framework

The first online survey, which constituted the second step of the evaluation and was conducted along the dimensions of the CVF, provided meaningful and reliable findings on the TARGET and ACTUAL culture and on differences between TARGET and ACTUAL. The standard survey questions specified by the CVF were used. These were adjusted slightly based on the results of the previous survey steps.
The survey was conducted using the Askallo survey software. It was carried out as a complete survey of all GIZ employees, development workers and interns who had a GIZ e-mail address. The response rate of 17.32% was satisfactory.

Table 8: Response to the online survey 1

Employee group	AMA	IMA	NMA	PMI[5]	EH	Overall result
Invited	2.478	2.288	12.264	1.936	523	19.489
Participants	934	1.249	891	136	165	3.375
Percent	37.69	54.59	7.27	7.02	31.55	17.32

3.10 Focus group discussions

After differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture had been recorded in the previous online survey, the focus group discussions (FGD), which constituted the third step of the evaluation, served to understand the background of these differences more precisely. The FGD also investigated how employees deal with these differences in their everyday work. They also provided information for the development of the second online survey questionnaire (see below).

Participants were selected using a stratified random sample. In the first step, the locations of the employees were determined. One of the main reasons for this was the interest in examining differences between "categories" of locations: domestic and foreign; fragile and non-fragile context. Furthermore, employees from as many countries as possible were to be reached. For this purpose, it was advisable to conduct the FGD at the locations of the training hubs of the Academy for International Cooperation (AIZ)[6] and to coordinate with the timing of the training sessions planned there, so that AIZ training participants could participate in FGD. In a second step, categories of employees were formed and candidates for the FGD were randomly selected. The FGD took place in homogeneous groups based on the "function group". Categories constituted AMA with/without leadership responsibility, EH, IMA, NMA with leadership responsibility, NMA with technical tasks, NMA with administrative tasks and PMI (see Table 9: Focus group discussions).

Employees were asked to participate in the FGD but had the opportunity to decline. In such cases, another random selection was made until enough participants per FGD were reached.

Between March 2019 (Germany) and April/May 2019 (abroad) a total of 30 FGDs took place at different locations with different function groups (see Table 9).

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[5] The low response rate in this function group leads to the assumption that many PMI have assigned themselves to the IMA function group. However, there is no proof of this

[6] Bangkok/Thailand, Bogotá/Colombia and Addis Ababa/Ethiopia

Table 9: Focus group discussions

Germany	
Locations / number of FGD in brackets:	• Eschborn (3) • Bonn (3) • Berlin (3)
Composition 33ft he FGD:	• Staff with management functions (salary bands 5/6/7) • Staff with technical functions • Staff with administrative functions
Abroad	
Locations / number FGD in brackets:	Training hubs 33ft he Akademie für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (AIZ): • Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (5) • Bangkok, Thailand (5) • Bogotá, Colombia (5) Fragile states: • Afghanistan (1) • DR Congo (1) • Iraq (1) • Sudan (1) • Pakistan (1)
Composition 33ft he FGD:	• International managers (salary bands 5/6/7) (AMA) • National managers (salary bands 5/6/7) (NMA) • International staff with technical functions (AMA/EH) • National staff with technical functions (NMA) • National staff with administrative functions (NMA)

In the FGDs, employees were openly asked about the reasons that prevent them from behaving according to their desired culture and about the determinants of their behavioural intentions. The results also provided the hypotheses or items (survey questions[7]), which were then used to test the behavioural beliefs in a coherent manner – in the sense of the TPB[8].

3.11 Discussion in the IDA community and consideration of MDBs

In addition to the four survey steps of the evaluation, a discussion moderated by the Evaluation Unit took place in an IDA community over a period of four weeks in April and May 2019. This offered interested staff members the opportunity, in addition to the randomly selected FGDs, to jointly reflect on the results of the first online survey and to look for explanations, to name further aspects and examples of positive or negative experiences. Each week, the CVF focused on one of the four cultural dimensions. The Evaluation Unit presented the results of the online survey on the respective dimension and was also able to introduce first results from the FGD,

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[7] All hypotheses tested are listed in Appendix III.

[8] Criteria for the selection of hypotheses from the FGD that were included in the second online survey: Emotionality and intensity, frequency, influenceability (and thus suitability for deriving recommendations and options for action), subjective perception of the significance for the sustainability of the GIZ.

which had already been partially analysed. The evaluation of the discussion in the IDA Community was presented to the RG in June 2019.

3.12 Second online survey: Theory of Planned Behaviour

The second online survey, which consituted the fourth step of the evaluation, served to generate meaningful and reliable findings on the causes of possible differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture and thus to validate the findings from the FGDs. Furthermore, possible reasons should be identified why GIZ employees act in accordance with their desired TARGET culture or why not. The behavioural determinants of the TPB served as a basis for the survey (see section 4.2.2)

The survey software was again Askallo. It was conducted as a complete survey among all GIZ employees and EH who had a GIZ e-mail address. The response rate of 23.5% was very satisfactory.

Table 10: Response to the online survey 2

Employee group	AMA	Trainee	IMA	NMA	PMI[9]	EH	Overall result
Invitees	2.478	93	2.288	12.264	1.936	523	19.582
Participants	966	24	1.443	1.783	156	188	4.560
Percent	38.98	25.81	63.07	14.54	8.06	35.95	23.29

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[9] The low response rate in this function group leads to the assumption that many PMI have assigned themselves to the IMA function group. However, there is no proof of this.

Evaluation results

4.1 Overview of the four cultural dimensions

In the following, the four cultural dimensions are briefly described again for better understanding.

- **Cooperation:** A very friendly working environment in which the employees reveal a lot about themselves: it is like an extended family. The managers or the leadership of the organization are perceived as mentors or even as parental figures. The organization is held together by loyalty and tradition. The commitment is great. The organization emphasizes the long-term benefits of employee development and places great emphasis on cohesion. Success is evaluated in terms of customer orientation and the concerns of the employees. The organization emphasizes teamwork, participation and unity.
- **Competition:** A result-oriented organization: The focus is on getting set tasks done. The employees are competitive and goal-oriented. The managers are strong drivers, doers and competitors. They are tough and demanding. The organization is held together by the absolute will to win. Reputation and success are common values. The long-term focus is on competitive actions and the achievement of measurable targets and objectives. Success is measured in terms of market share and market penetration. Competitive products/services and market leadership are important. The organizational style is a tough competitive thinking.
- **Creativity:** A dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative working environment: Employees are willing to take risks. The managers see themselves as innovators and are willing to take risks. The organization is held together by a dedication to experimentation and innovation. In the long term, the organization emphasizes growth and the acquisition of new resources. Success means developing unique and pioneering products and services. It is important to be a leader in these products or services. The organization supports individual initiative and freedom.
- **Control:** A highly formalised and structured working environment: Processes tell employees what to do. Managers are proud to be good coordinators and organisers with a focus on efficiency. The goal is a smoothly functioning organization. Formal rules and principles hold the organisation together. The long-term focus is on stability and performance with efficient, regular processes. Success is evaluated in terms of reliable performance, smooth planning and low costs. Human resources management is concerned with secure employment and predictability.

4.2 For a better understanding of the results

The results of the evaluation are divided into three blocks:
- Part A describes how the GIZ cultures present themselves, where the differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL cultures lie and how the behaviour pattern of GIZ employees is fundamentally shaped. Part A is therefore a description of the current situation.
- Part B highlights possible reasons for differences between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture and describes the factors influencing the behaviour of GIZ employees. Part B is therefore a description of what led to the "state of culture" (Part A) and what did not lead to it.
- Part C describes which "set screws" are available to induce certain behaviour in the different function groups. However, it should be noted that discrepancies between TARGET and ACTUAL represent a result from which a need for action can be directly derived, but they should not be assessed negatively. There is no objective "good" or "bad" in the assessments of ACTUAL and TARGET (see Chapter 5.2). The set screws are therefore not recommendations for action. Part C can rather be understood as an "optional list" for influencing the corporate culture, the contents of which can be referred to if necessary.
- It was a challenge to convert the extensive data material from the four survey steps into a user and reader

friendly report. For practical reasons, the evaluation team decided to structure the main findings along important messages ("key take aways" in grey boxes), which were discussed and prioritised together with the reference group and the Evaluation Unit. For didactic reasons, in many cases the results on the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ are presented together.

- Parts A and B contain numerous quotations from the FGD and the IDA community. These are not to be understood as results but illustrate the variety of opinions expressed in the course of the evaluation.

Part A: What characterises the GIZ culture and its actors?

This section of results focuses on the following central questions:

- How do the GIZ cultures present themselves?
- Where are the differences?
- What basically shapes the behaviour of GIZ employees?

In the following, the general and cross-cultural results are presented first, before the specific results in the individual cultural dimensions are discussed. We speak of weak deviations between TARGET and ACTUAL for differences less than 5 (negligible); medium deviations for differences between 5 and 10; and strong deviations for differences above 10.

4.3 General results

In all four cultural dimensions there are medium to strong discrepancies between the target and actual culture.

The chart on the right shows the overall result of the first online survey: GIZ employees would like to see lower levels of the cultural dimensions of control and competition and higher levels of cooperation and creativity.

Cooperation: The current situation in the cooperation dimension, i.e. the ACTUAL culture, is rated by the employees with 20 points. The TARGET culture, i.e. the culture that the employees want, with 31 points. With 11 points, this deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET is strong.

Competition: On the other side of the pole, the picture is reversed. The ACTUAL culture is rated with 29 points, the interviewees wish for much less (TARGET=18). Here, too, the deviation is 11 points and therefore strong.

Creativity: Similar to collaboration, employees want more of it than they currently experience (ACTUAL=18, TARGET=28). Here the deviation is medium with 10 points.

Figure 3: Overall result of first online survey

Control: On the other side of the pole, the picture is reversed as well. Employees want much less control than is perceived in the ACTUAL. The deviation between ACTUAL (33) and TARGET (23) is 10 points and therefore medium.

The standard deviation for the ACTUAL values is smaller than for the TARGET values, i.e. there is greater agreement among employees about how the culture should be than how they perceive the ACTUAL culture.

The perceptions of the ACTUAL culture in GIZ are comparable to the ACTUAL characteristics of a public administration. At the same time, there is a high acceptance of GIZ as a federal enterprise and the associated framework conditions, a high level of identification with GIZ and a strong desire to enhance the reputation of GIZ.[10]

The CVF has been applied in well over 13,000 organisations, including numerous public administrations[11]. The values in the graph on the right show a comparison between the ACTUAL culture of GIZ and the average values of the ACTUAL cultures of 48 randomly selected public administrations. It becomes clear that in the GIZ the characteristics in the four cultural dimensions can be compared in principle with a public administration. In comparison with private enterprises (average of more than 1,000 enterprises), the GIZ, as is typical for public administrations, shows significantly higher values in the cultural dimension "control".

The statistical analysis of the second online survey shows that there is a high acceptance of GIZ as a federal enterprise (including accountability), a high level of identification with GIZ and a strong desire to enhance the reputation of GIZ. This generally positive result is expressed in the very high mean values (i.e. high approval in the online survey).

The qualitative feedback from the FGD also underpins this positive result. In terms of accountability and compliance, the FGDs show a high level of understanding among employees for these aspects of the cultural

Figure 4: Comparison with a public administration

dimension of control. Employees believe that a better understanding of the institutional nature of GIZ, i.e. the need for specific rules in a federal enterprise, also leads to better acceptance of the rules and thus to greater compliance.

We are spending tax-payer's money, so there are good reasons to be diligent in following procurement law for example. (IDA, IMA)

Creating understanding for the rationale of compliance – this promotes the acceptance of control, rules, and formal structures. (FGD, FK, Inland)

The perceptions of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of managers and other GIZ employees are very similar.

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[10] While the findings on comparability with a public administration were obtained from the first online survey, the other findings listed in this box were derived from the second online survey.

[11] In the empirical surveys of Cameron & Quinn, only public administration is mentioned. There is no further differentiation.

Employees with and without management responsibility hardly differ in their assessments of the ACTUAL and TARGET culture (see Fig. 5). This is evident both from the interviews with managers, at the end of which they also made an overall assessment of the ACTUAL and TARGET culture, and from the first online survey.

Many aspects raised in the interviews with managers were also addressed and discussed by employees without management responsibility within the FGD. In the interviews, managers mainly expressed the desire for more cooperation (TARGET) and referred in particular to less competition, more cooperation, appreciation, trust and respect both among employees and between employees and their managers. The latter were

Figure 5: Comparison of target culture for managers and other employees

also atrributed the role of empowering employees and providing them with orientation.

In the dimensions of control and creativity there was also a large consensus regarding the desire for faster decisions and less hierarchy and bureaucracy. Many of the interview partners also assign managers and other employees with the responsibility to promote a culture of mistakes, to give employees more freedom, to be more visionary and not just to focus on economic aspects.

According to the feedback, GIZ employees are strongly motivated through meaningful work and shared values. Both in the interviews and in the FGDs, this is mentioned as a positive factor that promotes cooperation, motivates to take initiative and thus encourages creativity and orientation towards the results of GIZ's work.

The results of the work of GIZ on site, that is the connective tissue in the body of GIZ.
(Interview, FK Germany)

The target culture of GIZ, as reflected in the corporate strategy documents, differs in some respects from the perception of employees and managers.

Based on a comprehensive analysis of corporate strategic GIZ documents, in addition to the target culture from the perspective of managers and the target culture of GIZ employees without management responsibility, yet

another target culture was captured: the target culture specified by GIZ documents.

A comparison of these target cultures reveals a similar picture in the cultural dimensions of cooperation and competition. However, the TARGET culture from the documents clearly differs in the dimensions creativity (undervalued) and control (overvalued). The greatest deviation is in the creativity dimension: Here the values from the documents are very low, i.e. this dimension is given very little importance in the documents. Due to the large number of documents evaluated and the methodical approach to document analysis - qualitative as well as quantitative evaluation via a specially developed crawler - the result

Figure 6: TARGET culture from documents compared to interviews and online survey

can be considered extremely robust and representative. Even after the inclusion of individual documents, which, for example, explicitly call for and motivate creativity, little would change in the overall picture, since the majority of the documents and texts examined do not emphasize this dimension.

Overall, there are only slight differences in the perception of the target and actual culture between the individual regions.

In the following paragraph, only the most significant or striking differences between the regions are highlighted; more details are given in the annex.

Comparing the overall results of the first online survey by region[12], there are only slight differences in the perception of the ACTUAL and the TARGET culture: they are at a maximum of 3 points each in the regional comparison of the ACTUAL and TARGET evaluations. All regions and sub-regions are equal in their basic assessment of the ACTUAL and TARGET culture: Employees want more cooperation and creativity and less competition and control. The differences become somewhat clearer when sub-regions are also considered. In Africa, the differences in the perception of the ACTUAL and TARGET culture are slightly less pronounced than in APLAK and EMZ. In all regions the deviations are greater for AMA than for NMA. In Latin America, these differences between the two functional groups are less marked than in other regions; in Africa, especially in Southern Africa, they are most pronounced. Within Asia, the greatest differences in ACTUAL/TARGET values are found in East Asia. Here, the deviations are particularly pronounced for AMA, especially in the control dimension. In the EMZ region the deviations are slightly higher than in APLAK. While here too NMA show smaller deviations than AMA, these vary very strongly depending on the cultural dimension: Least in the dimension of competition (here the ACTUAL value is comparatively low and the TARGET value comparatively high) and most in the dimension of cooperation.

Table 11: Regional differences between actual and target values (first online survey)

		Africa	Asia	Latin America	EMZ
Cooperation	ACTUAL	20	20	21	20
	TARGET	29	31	31	32
Competition	ACTUAL	29	27	26	29
	TARGET	20	18	18	17
Creativity	ACTUAL	18	18	20	18
	TARGET	26	28	29	28
Control	ACTUAL	34	34	33	33
	TARGET	24	23	22	23

Overall, there are only slight differences in the perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of GIZ between the individual function groups.

The main findings are summarised below. More details can be found in Table 12.
The differences in the results of the first online survey are also small when comparing function groups. The

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[12] The basis for the regional allocation is the countries in which the respondents have their place of work. This means that employees from the operational divisions based in Germany are "Germany" and not, for example, APLAK.

evaluations of the function groups differ by a maximum of 5 points regarding the ACTUAL culture and by a maximum of 6 points regarding the TARGET culture. IMA show strong target-actual deviations in all cultural dimensions, they have a strong desire for more cooperation and a very strong deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET in competition (16 points). PMI have medium to large deviations between ACTUAL and TARGET values. This group has a higher ACTUAL value in the cultural dimension of competition than all other employee groups (and with 16 points the greatest deviation). They also have the highest TARGET value of all employee groups in the cultural dimension of cooperation. At AMA, the target-actual deviations are strong in all dimensions. AMA and EH have a higher ACTUAL value in the culture dimension Control than all other employee groups. EH and AMA are basically very similar in their assessments of ACTUAL and TARGET. The target-actual deviations are even slightly higher for EH and are thus the highest on average of all function groups (between 11 and 14 points). The perception of NMA differs slightly from all other functional groups. They have slightly higher ACTUAL values for cooperation and creativity and slightly lower ACTUAL values for competition and control. At the same time, their TARGET values are slightly lower for Collaboration and Creativity and slightly higher for Competition and Control compared with the other functional groups. NMA therefore have the smallest deviations between the target and actual values, they are only between 8 and 5 points.

Table 12: Differences between function groups on actual and target values (first online survey)

		AMA	IMA	NMA	PMI	EH
Cooperation	ACTUAL	18	20	23	20	18
	TARGET	30	32	30	34	32
Competition	ACTUAL	29	30	26	31	30
	TARGET	18	16	21	15	18
Creativity	ACTUAL	17	18	19	18	17
	TARGET	29	29	25	27	28
Control	ACTUAL	36	32	32	31	36
	TARGET	23	23	24	23	22

Personnel responsibility and seniority: The differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility and between employees with more or less than five years of service are negligible, with a difference of between 1 and 3 points between the respective comparison groups.

While the differences between functional groups are rather small in the perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture of the GIZ, they partly differ in how behavioural intentions are influenced (see Part B).

The behaviour of most GIZ employees is determined above all by their personal attitude and whether they feel empowered (perceived behaviour control).[13]

The personal attitude is based on the one hand on the expectation that one's own behaviour has a certain consequence and on the other hand on the subjective evaluation of this consequence. The perceived control of behaviour ("I feel empowered") expresses the ease with which the behaviour can be carried out according to

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[13] More detailed descriptions of the behaviour determinants of TPBs are provided in section 3.4 and in Part B of this chapter. To understand this result, it is sufficient to consider the following text passage 72.

the conviction of the GIZ employee.

The behaviour of most GIZ employees - without differences between regions, functional groups, etc. - is on the one hand mainly influenced by personal attitude, i.e. whether positive expectations/consequences are associated with it. Past experience is also reflected in the personal attitude. Learning experiences from the past influence the behaviour or the formulation of behavioural intentions, i.e. the expectation whether or not an employee benefits from a certain behaviour also depends on whether this person has had good or bad experiences in the past. On the other hand, the behaviour of GIZ employees is influenced by whether or not they feel empowered to do so.

The subjective norm, i.e. the expectations of important caregivers, has only little significance for GIZ employees. This result does not mean that the opinion of others in GIZ is generally perceived as unimportant. Only with regard to reducing the discrepancy between SHOULD and ACTUAL in different cultural dimensions (question posed by the evaluation) does the opinion of others have little influence on the formulation of behavioural intentions that can bring SHOULD and ACTUAL closer together. For the formulation of (new) behavioural intentions it is therefore not sufficient if employees know what their colleagues and/or managers want. The results of the second online survey show that managers, for example, are more likely to influence behaviour by changing the personal attitude of employees (e.g. through motivation and rewards) and by creating the framework (e.g. by providing resources and enabling them to carry out the behaviour (see also Part B).

4.4 TARGET and ACTUAL in the cooperation dimension

The employees of GIZ would like to see much more cooperation.

Overall, GIZ employees would like to see significantly more cooperation. With this result, however, it must be considered that the ACTUAL value in this cultural dimension is already high. Experience shows that employees generally want more and more cooperation (see also section 5.2). Table 13 summarises the most important results in the cooperation dimension; these are discussed in the following text with further details.

Values in brackets		Function group	(Sub-)Region	Function group and (Sub-)Region
ACTUAL values	**Lowest ACTUAL values**	AMA, EH (18)	Southern Africa (17)	NMA in Southern Africa (16)
	Highest ACTUAL values	NMA (23)	Latin America total (21)	NMA in Asia total (25)
TARGET values	**Lowest TARGET value**	AMA, NMA (30)	Africa total (29)	AMA in Latin America (28)
	Highest TARGET value	PMI (34)	East Asia, Central America and Caribbean, EMZ total, Germany (32)	NMA in East Asia, PMI (34)
TARGET-ACTUAL Deviations	**Lowest Deviation**	NMA (7)	Africa total (9)	NMA in Asia total (6)
	Largest Deviation	EH, PMI (14)	East Asia (13)	AMA and NMA in Southern Africa, Total AMA in Asia, AMA in East Asia (13)

Function groups: When looking at the differences according to function groups, AMA and EH rate the current cooperation lowest (ACTUAL=18). The desire for cooperation is highest among PMI (TARGET=34). The greatest difference between ACTUAL and TARGET is found in EH and PMI (14 points each between ACTUAL and TARGET).

Regions: regional differences in the cooperation dimension are small. The ACTUAL values are between 20 and 21 points; the TARGET values are between 29 and 32 points. Further differentiation by sub-region reveals some differences. For example, employees in Southern Africa rate cooperation as lowest (ACTUAL=17); in the region "Latin America as a whole" the ACTUAL value is highest at 21. The desire for more cooperation is least pronounced in "Africa as a whole" (ACTUAL=29). At 32 points, the TARGET value is highest in East Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, "EMZ total" and in Germany as a sub-region. Since the ACTUAL value in East Asia is comparatively low at 19 points, the deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET is greatest in this subregion (13 points). The smallest deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET is found in "Africa - Total" (9 points).

Function groups and Regions: NMA in East Asia and PMI (SHOULD=34) would like to see the most cooperation. NMAs in Southern Africa rate current cooperation the lowest (ACTUAL=16); NMA in "Asia as a whole" (ACTUAL=25) rate the current situation the highest. NMA in "Asia as a whole" also seem to be the most satisfied in terms of cooperation: The difference between ACTUAL and TARGET is lowest for this group at 6 points - followed by NMA in "Africa as a whole" and AMA in "Latin America as a whole". Thus, NMA from Southern

Africa are very different from NMA in Africa as a whole. Differences between ACTUAL and TARGET are highest in Southern Africa (no difference between AMA and NMA) and for AMA in Asia and East Asia (13 points each). Interestingly, AMA in Asia and East Asia (apart from staff from Southern Africa) are the least satisfied in terms of "working together" - while NMA in the same region are the most satisfied.

Personnel responsibility: While employees with and without personnel responsibility assess the ACTUAL level of cooperation in the same way, employees without personnel responsibility would like slightly more cooperation than employees with personnel responsibility (TARGET=32 vs. 30 points). In this cultural dimension, employees without personnel responsibility therefore have a slightly higher deviation from the ACTUAL-TARGET value than employees with personnel responsibility.

Period of employment: Employees with more or less than five years of service differ only slightly in the results for the cooperation dimension. The TARGET values are identical (TARGET=31), the ACTUAL value is one point higher for "newer" employees than for their colleagues.

FGD: In the FGDs in Germany, cooperation was often discussed in terms of cross-departmental and cross-divisional cooperation, where great potential for improvement was identified. The bauhaus reform process was also discussed several times, which in the opinion of most focus group participants had a negative impact on the culture of cooperation. Abroad, on the other hand, cooperation was generally viewed very positively. Most participants expressed potential for improvement regarding cooperation with headquarters and the integration of the external structure, which was perceived as insufficient.

The division of labour has increased insanely in commercial activities and HR. And a very strong formalisation with bauhaus. It recalls the invention of the assembly line. There are psychological strain and inefficiency. (FGD, FK Germany)

Functionality is a sacred cow that gave us bauhaus. What is lost is identification with the overall process and ownership. (FGD, FK Germany)

4.5 TARGET and ACTUAL in the dimension of competition

Employees want less competition overall.

Overall, GIZ employees would like to see less competition in their working environment. The following is a summary of the most important results regarding TARGET and ACTUAL in the competition dimension.

In the first online survey, the competition dimension was very broadly defined. For example, the competition dimension in the CVF includes both internal competition, i.e. competition between colleagues, and external competition, i.e. competition between GIZ and other organisations (see section 4.1).

Table 14: Main results of the first online survey relating to competition

Values in brackets		Function groups	(Sub-)Region	Function groups and (Sub-)Region
ACTUAL values	Lowest ACTUAL values	NMA (26)	Latin America (26)	NMA in Asia (24)
	Highest ACTUAL values	PMI (31)	Germany (30)	AMA in Africa and East Asia (30)
TARGET values	Lowest TARGET value	PMI (15)	Germany (16)	PMI in Germany (15)
	Highest TARGET value	NMA (21)	Africa (20)	NMA in Africa (23)
TARGET ACTUAL Deviations	Lowest Deviation	NMA (4)	Latin America (8)	NMA in Africa, Asia and EMZ (4)
	Largest Deviation	PMI (16)	Germany (14)	PMI in Germany (16)

Function groups: If we look at the results disaggregated by function groups, it is evident that PMI perceive competition most strongly (ACTUAL=31), closely followed by IMA and EH (ACTUAL=30). Since PMI also want the least competition from all function groups at the same time (ACTUAL=15), the discrepancy between AC-TUAL and TARGET is highest for them. NMA perceive the current competition as the least strong (AC-TUAL=26). The desire for less competition is also the least pronounced in NMA: They rate the competition target with 21 points. Thus, ACTUAL and TARGET are closest in this function group (discrepancy=4). Looking for similarities between the function groups, IMA and PMI on the one hand and AMA and EH on the other hand are quite similar in their assessments of ACTUAL and TARGET.

Regions: Southern Africa and East Asia are congruent with the overall result of ACTUAL=29 and TAR-GET=18. Germany is the region where employees want the least competition (TARGET=16). The highest target value is "Africa total" (TARGET=20). Employees in "Latin America as a whole" perceive the least competition; competition is perceived most strongly in Germany (ACTUAL=30). Germany is therefore also the region with the greatest discrepancy between TARGET and ACTUAL in this cultural dimension (14 points) and Latin America (8 points) the region with the lowest - closely followed by "Africa overall", "Asia overall" and "Central America and the Caribbean" with 9 points discrepancy each.

Function groups and regions: While AMA are very similar across regions (ACTUAL values between 27 and 30 points; TARGET values in all regions 18 points; discrepancies between 9 and 12 points[14]), NMA differ. As shown above, NMA perceive less competition than AMA. The actual values for NMA are between 24 points (Asia as a whole) and 28 points (Southern Africa). At the same time, the desire for less competition is less pronounced among NMA than among AMA: the target values of NMA are above those of AMA in almost all regions (target values for NMA between 18 and 23 points). Only in East Asia does the TARGET value for NMA correspond to that of AMA. The discrepancies for NMA range from 4 points (Africa overall, Asia overall and EMZ overall) to 9 points (Southern Africa). Regarding the discrepancies between ACTUAL and TARGET in the

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[14] The largest discrepancies in AMA are found in Africa as a whole and East Asia (12 points); the smallest discrepancies in AMA are found in Latin America as a whole and Central America and the Caribbean (9 points).

dimension of competition, AMA and NMA are thus most varied in "Africa as a whole" (followed by Asia as a whole and the EMC as a whole). NMA and AMA are most similar in Southern Africa, in "Latin America as a whole" and in the Central America and Caribbean region.

Personnel responsibility: Employees with personnel responsibility have lower target-actual deviations than employees without personnel responsibility (9 and 11 points respectively). While personnel responsibility has no influence on the desired level of competition (both ACTUAL=18), employees without personnel responsibility perceive competition slightly more strongly than their colleagues with personnel responsibility (ACTUAL=29 and 27).

Period of employment: The length of service has only very little effect on the result, even in the dimension of competition. Employees with more than 5 years of service assess the current competitive situation slightly higher (ACTUAL=29 and 28) and would like to see slightly less of it than their colleagues (TARGET=17 and 19). Thus, the discrepancy between ACTUAL and TARGET is slightly higher for employees with more than 5 years of service than for colleagues who have worked for a shorter period in GIZ (discrepancy: 12 vs. 9 points).

FGD: In the FGDs following the first online survey, a more nuanced discussion of what employees understand by competition was possible. For example, the understanding of internal competition related primarily to career opportunities within the company. In all FGDs in Germany and among AMA, the topic of "visibility" was very present. PMI and AMA were concerned about the open-ended employment contract (UBV) (a topic that was also discussed in other FGDs in Germany, but the participants were rarely directly affected). The majority of NMA in the FGDs believed that internal competition was less relevant for them than for AMA. Internal competition was more related to follow-up contracts at the end of the project and to the "few opportunities for promotion". In principle, the opinion was expressed that NMA with technical tasks were more likely to be affected by internal competition than NMA with administrative tasks, as the latter were more flexible in their placement opportunities.

> *But I think this is even more relevant for technical staff than for us. Once their project is over, they can't easily switch to another project, like we admin people can. (FGD, NMA Administration)*

FGD: Other aspects of internal competition discussed in the FGDs are competition for resources (especially personnel and internal services) and competition passed on to GIZ between the BMZ and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and between different departments within these commissioners (see section 4.10).

FGD: External competition in the FGDs, on the other hand, was mainly related to competition between GIZ and other implementation organisations for additional funds (keyword: acquisition of third-party funds/co-financing). NMA also frequently addressed external competition for the favour of partners.

4.6 TARGET and ACTUAL in the dimension creativity

GIZ employees want to work more creatively.

Overall, GIZ employees would like to see more creativity in their working environment: The difference between ACTUAL (=18) and TARGET (=28) is moderate at ten points[15].

In this dimension too, the disaggregated results are presented in tabular form and are described in more detail in the following text.

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[15] In the MEB the statement "GIZ's corporate culture is characterised by a great deal of flexibility and creativity" was largely agreed.

Table 15: The main results of the first online survey on the creativity dimension

Values in brackets		Function groups	(Sub-)Region	Function groups and (Sub-)Region
ACTUAL	Lowest ACTUAL values	AMA, EH (17)	Southern Africa and East Asia (17)	NMA in Southern Africa, AMA in East Asia and EMZ (16)
	Highest ACTUAL values	NMA (19)	Latin America (20)	NMA in Asia (21)
TARGET values	Lowest TARGET value	NMA (25)	Africa (26)	NMA in Africa (23)
	Highest TARGET value	IMA, AMA (29)	Latin America, Mediterranean and Caribbean, Germany (29)	AMA in East Asia, Latin America and Mediterranean and Caribbean (30)
TARGET ACTUAL Deviation	Lowest Deviation	NMA (6)	Africa (8)	NMA in Africa (4)
	Largest Deviation	AMA (12)	East Asia (11)	AMA in East Asia (14)

Function groups: Comparing the function groups, the discrepancies between ACTUAL and TARGET are greatest for AMA (12 points) and for IMA (11 points). NMA have the smallest discrepancies (6 points), mainly due to the lower classification of the ACTUAL and TARGET of creativity (TARGET=25).

Regions: Comparing the regions, employees in "Africa as a whole" seem to be most satisfied with the dimension creativity. Here the deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET is the smallest, followed by "Latin America as a whole" (8 and 9 points respectively). In "Africa overall", the ACTUAL value corresponds to the overall result, while the TARGET value is slightly lower. In Latin America, the ACTUAL score for creativity is even higher than the overall score, but the ACTUAL score is better.

Function groups and regions: NMA in Southern Africa, AMA in East Asia and AMA in EMZ rate the current situation regarding creativity lowest (IST=16). NMA in Asia rate the ACTUAL situation highest among all NMA. The largest difference between ACTUAL and TARGET with 14 points is perceived by AMA in East Asia, closely followed by AMA in EMZ (13 points discrepancy). The smallest discrepancy for NMA is in "Africa total". This is also where the greatest difference within a region becomes apparent: While the discrepancy for NMA is smallest in "Africa total", it is high in the sub-region Southern Africa for the same functional group with 12 points. The difference between AMA and NMA in "Africa total" is also striking: AMA see the discrepancy at 12 points; here the reason is mainly the different classification of the creativity TARGET. In the sub-region East Asia, too, the differences between AMA and NMA are large: The difference between ACTUAL and TARGET is much smaller for NMA than for AMA (5 and 14 points respectively). Here, too, this is mainly due to the different classification of the ACTUAL and TARGET.

Personnel responsibility: The differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility are similarly small. They rate the ACTUAL in the same way but differ by one point in the rating of the TARGET: Employees with personnel responsibility would like a little more creativity (29 vs. 28 points).

Period of employment: The length of service has only a very small influence on the TARGET and ACTUAL

culture in the dimension of creativity. Employees who have worked for GIZ for less than 5 years have a slightly larger deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET (11 vs. 10 points), although they rate the ACTUAL slightly higher (18 vs. 17 points).

FGD: In the FGDs, a distinction was often made between creativity in technical work and creativity in administration. The latter was often referred to as flexibility or creativity regarding the flexible - but nevertheless rule-compliant - application of rules.

What exactly is the demarcation? When are you creative, when are you not creative? Many creative tasks are not even named that. A creative Excel sheet that makes the work easier is also creative. The demand of executives for ideas is also a creative process, even if nothing has been implemented yet. (FGD, FK in Germany)

I think for us, we must focus on the aspect of flexibility, when talking about creativity. If you work in admin, creativity is not the term you are looking for. What we need is flexibility in adhering to the rules. (FGD, NMA administration)

FGD: Overall, the FGD also discussed the ACTUAL, i.e. the opportunities to work creatively, controversially. On the one hand, the view was expressed that technical work in the GIZ is per se creative, because one always works without blueprints and must adapt to contexts. On the other hand, there was the opinion that the framework conditions set out in the offers, such as indicators, determine and often restrict creativity.

When does one start being creative? Creative can also mean that you must deal with what little you have. [FGD, EH]

FGD: Creativity was also very often discussed in the context of cooperation and control. Those who can work creatively are provided with trust, appreciation and less control, especially with regard to cooperation with other colleagues. Only through the exchange with other people could creativity arise.

Creativity comes about when things come together that would otherwise not come together and is therefore connected with cooperation. (FGD, FK Germany)

4.7 TARGET and ACTUAL in the control dimension

Employees generally wish to have less control, but at the same time it is accepted that a range of rules and accountability obligations arise from the institutional set-up of the GIZ.

Overall, GIZ employees would like to see less control in their working environment. The deviation between ACTUAL (33) and TARGET (23) is 10 points and therefore medium [16].

As in the previous chapters, the most important values from the first online survey relating to the dimension control are presented in a table and further elaborated in the following text passages.

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[16] At the MDB, staff largely agreed with the statement "The guidelines and orientations contained in the OuR are appropriate and helpful".

Table 16: Main results of the first online survey on the control dimension

Values in brackets		Function groups	(Sub-)Region	Function groups and (Sub-)Region
ACTUAL values	**Lowest ACTUAL values**	PMI (31)	Latin America, EMZ (33)	NMA in Asia (29)
	Highest ACTUAL values	AMA, EH (36)	Southern Africa (38)	NMA in Southern Africa (41)
TARGET values	**Lowest TARGET value**	EH (22)	East Asia, Latin America, Mediterranean and Caribbean (22)	AMA in East Africa (21)
	Highest TARGET value	NMA (24)	Africa (24)	NMA in Africa (25)
TARGET ACTUAL Devi-	**Lowest Deviation**	PMI, NMA (8)	Germany (9)	NMA in Africa and Asia (7)
	Largest Deviation	EH (13)	Southern Africa (14)	NMA in Southern Africa (17)

Function groups: The actual values for the different function groups vary between 31 (PMI) and 36 (AMA and EH) points. The TARGET values of the function groups are very similar: EH wish for the least control (SET=22), among NMA the wish for less control is the weakest within the function groups (SET=24). Looking at the differences between ACTUAL and TARGET, the discrepancy is highest for EH (13 points) and lowest for PMI and NMA (8 points).

Regions: A comparison of the regions reveals only very small differences at first glance. Both the ACTUAL and TARGET values of the regions Africa, Asia, Latin America and EMZ are very similar; they range between ACTUAL=33 (Latin America and EMZ) and ACTUAL=34 (Africa and Asia) or TARGET=22 (Latin America) and TARGET=24 (Africa). Differences only become apparent when sub-regions (and function groups in regions and sub-regions - see below) are considered. Southern Africa shows the greatest discrepancy between ACTUAL and TARGET. The reason for this is the comparatively high ACTUAL value in this sub-region (ACTUAL=38). East Asia also has a fairly high gap between ACTUAL and TARGET at 13 points. Although the ACTUAL value here is also high (ACTUAL=35), this sub-region also has the lowest TARGET value (TARGET=22), together with "Latin America as a whole" and the Mediterranean and Caribbean sub-region. The region EMZ has the smallest deviation between ACTUAL and TARGET. If one adds the sub-regions in the analysis, the sub-region Germany has the smallest deviation (10 and 9 points respectively). This region or sub-region classifies the current situation in relation to the cultural dimension of control most positively (ACTUAL=33 or 32).

Function groups and regions: If one differentiates the results both by (sub-)regions and by function groups, NMA in Southern Africa have the highest ACTUAL value (IST=41). The lowest ACTUAL value for NMA is in "Asia total" (ACTUAL=29). The target values by function group fluctuate less than the actual values and range between 21 points (AMA in East Asia) and 25 points (NMA in Africa as a whole). The discrepancy between ACTUAL and TARGET is greatest for NMA in Southern Africa and AMA in East Asia (17 and 16 points respectively). It is smallest for NMA in Africa overall and NMA in Asia overall (7 points).

Personnel responsibility: As in the other dimensions, the length of service makes only a small difference.

While in the other three dimensions the difference between ACTUAL and TARGET was slightly smaller for employees with more than 5 years of service than in the comparison group, it is slightly higher (1 point) for the control dimension. The reason for this is the one-point higher assessment of the ACTUAL in the control dimension (ACTUAL=34 or 33 points) among employees who have been working with GIZ for a longer period. The target values of both groups are the same.

Period of employment: Even in this dimension, personnel responsibility has little influence on the discrepancy between TARGET and ACTUAL. Employees with and without personnel responsibility only differ by one point in their assessment of the ACTUAL value (ACTUAL=34 and 33 respectively). Both groups assess the TARGET control with 23 points.

FGD: The participants in the FGDs made a fundamental distinction between "the management is watching my fingers" on one hand, and compliance requirements for a federal enterprise, the body of rules and regulations as guidelines and standardization for greater efficiency on the other hand. This means that control has a negative connotation in the first interpretation and is thus seen as expression of a lack of trust.

It depends on how you deal with control. Whether you perceive it as help or perceive it as an attack on your authority. [FGD, AMA FK]

FGD: On the other hand, control in the form of regulations and standardization also provides security and is thus positively connotated. Overall, the FGDs expressed a very high level of understanding for GIZ compliance requirements. In this respect, the communication of rules and support in their application was criticised.

Part B: What influences the behaviour of GIZ employees and what does not?

This section of results focuses on the following central questions:

- What are possible reasons for these differences, i.e. why do GIZ employees (not) behave according to their desired target culture?
- What influences the development of behavioural intentions in GIZ?

For a better understanding of the results, the following box briefly describes the behavioural determinants of the theory of planned behaviour, which formed the basis of the FGD and the second online survey and which were used to identify the influencing factors.

- Personal attitude ("I benefit from it"): Decisions between different alternatives are based on the expectation that the behaviour has an individual consequence and on the subjective evaluation of this consequence.
- Subjective norm ("the opinion of others is important to me"): The subjectively perceived social consequences of behaviour. On the one hand it is about how other important people see the behaviour in question (social norms) and on the other hand about the willingness to comply with the wishes of these other people.
- Perceived behavioural control ("I feel empowered"): The ease with which the behaviour can be carried out according to the conviction of the person concerned. It represents a person's opinion of how easy or difficult the execution of the behaviour is likely to be.

(Stroebe, W., Jonas, K., Hewstone, M., 2003)

Furthermore, in the following we will speak of positive and negative effects (influences). Effect strengths starting at 0.26 are called strong effects, above 0.15 they are significant effects that should not be ignored. Up to 0.15 one speaks of weak effects. With negative effects, the signs are reversed accordingly. Negative effects therefore do not mean that they are negative for GIZ, but merely that they are negative correlations.

4.8 General results

The following figure shows that in GIZ, behaviour is most strongly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. The coefficient of determination (R^2) in the second online survey varies between 23% and 65%, i.e. this model alone can explain up to 65% of the behaviour of GIZ employees.

Figure 7: Influences of behavioural determinants in all cultural dimensions

Managers have a strong influence on the corporate culture and influence all behavioural determinants of a GIZ employee.

Managers have a strong[17] positive influence on personal attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. However, since the subjective norm has a lower overall effect on intention than the other two behavioural determinants, the strongest influence is exerted by influencing the personal attitude of employees, e.g. through motivation, and by perceived behavioural control, e.g. through the empowerment of employees.

We work together above all when the manager specifies this. Conversely, it can also mean that we do not work together, although we would consider it sensible. [FGD, PMI]

This large (statistically proven) influence of managers is supported by the results of the FGD. Here, too, the important role of managers and their complexity regarding the shaping of employees' behavioural intentions became clear. In addition to clear guidelines, the FGD and interviews repeatedly emphasized the importance of the role model function of managers, i.e. that the desired actions are exemplified. In the FGDs, for example, competition at management level was frequently cited as a negative example, which has a negative impact on cooperation among GIZ employees.

You no longer believe the senior executives when they say we need to cooperate more. It's just a matter of securing your position. (FGD, FK Germany)

I experience the desire for cooperation at employee level. At divisional level and on the Management Board, there is fierce competition. Employees are almost set upon each other in conflict. It is important to hear this from the board of directors, but they do not live

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[17] In the MDB, among the five questions with the highest approval, three are dedicated to managers. The statement "Cooperation with my boss is characterised by mutual trust, respect and support" was rated "I fully agree". The package of statements on the topic of "disciplinary manager" scored above average in the MEB. Among other things, the statement "My boss is a role model for me regarding its behaviour in the working environment" was rated as "largely agree".

Uncertainty about continued employment (e.g. fixed-term contracts) and the perceived need to be visible in the company, with few exceptions, hardly influence change in the discrepancy between the target and actual culture.

While the uncertainty about continued employment was addressed in almost all FGDs and a negative influence was highlighted in almost all areas, the results of the second online survey showed hardly any influence of this factor on the behavioural intention to reduce (or increase) the discrepancy between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture. Similarly, the general perception of many GIZ employees that in order to be successful they must be visible in the company has - statistically speaking - hardly any influence on the behavioural intentions to change the discrepancy between TARGET and ACTUAL.

The fact that statistically speaking there are hardly any effects of these two factors does not mean that they have no significance in the company. For example, MEB 2019 has also identified career development opportunities for employees as a need for action. Merely to answer the questions that are at the heart of this evaluation, why there are differences between TARGET and ACTUAL and how these can be reduced, these factors cannot be listed as reasons or significant influencing factors (drivers). Other aspects which are not in the focus of this evaluation are certainly affected by fixed-term contracts or the desire for visibility, and in the opinion of the evaluation team, resulting concerns should in principle be taken seriously.

Even a heavy workload, with few exceptions, has no effect on the discrepancy between the target and actual culture.

The high workload had been discussed in the FGDs as a significant obstacle to cooperation and creativity. The overall results show no influence in the dimension cooperation and competition (internal). In the dimensions creativity and competition (external), however, it could be demonstrated that a high workload leads to less creative behaviour and to GIZ employees exposing themselves less to external competition. The MEB 2019 has identified workload as a need for action.

Function groups and cooperation: There are differences depending on the function group. For example, a high workload among AMA and employees with personnel responsibility even has a weakly positive effect on their intention to work together, i.e. a high workload even leads to more cooperation in these groups. In the other function groups, a high workload has no effect on cooperation, as in the aggregated result.

Regions and cooperation: If the results are disaggregated by region, there are no differences from the overall result in the cooperation dimension.

Function group and creativity: The creativity dimension differs according to function group. In the disaggregated view of the results, the workload only has an influence on creativity for AMA, EH and employees without personnel responsibility. The picture, however, is very different: While there is a positive correlation in the case of AMA (high workload leads to more creative work), the influence is negative for trainees and employees without personnel responsibility (high workload leads to less creativity).

Region and creativity: A high workload has different effects in the dimension creativity depending on the region. Only in the region EMZ the results correspond to the overall result, i.e. a negative influence could be proven. In the other regions there is no influence.

Function group and competition (internal): In the dimension competition (internal), employees with personnel responsibility are the only group in which the high workload has an influence. The effect here is negative, i.e. a high workload leads to less internal competition in this group.

Regions and competition (internal): As in the cooperation dimension, the results in the competition dimension (internal) show no differences in the results disaggregated by region; the results of all regions correspond to the overall result.

Function group and competition (external): The picture changes regarding external competition. Here, the disaggregated results for AMA, IMA and employees with personnel responsibility correspond to the overall result: A high workload leads to less external competition. In all other function groups, no influence could be

proven.

Regions and competition (external): As in the dimension creativity, the EMZ region differs from the other regions and corresponds to the overall result: The influence of a high workload on external competition is negative.

4.9 What influences cooperation and what does not?

Overall, managers, appreciation, freedom of decision and career aspirations have the greatest influence on cooperation in GIZ.

The second online survey showed that managers, appreciation, freedom of decision and career aspirations are the strongest drivers for cooperation in GIZ, which primarily affect the intention to work together through personal attitude ("do I benefit from it?") and perceived behavioural control ("do I feel empowered?") (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Factors influencing the cooperation dimension

Managers: Managers have an important role in the cultural dimension of cooperation. On one hand, this has been statistically proven. On the other hand, the exposed position of managers was confirmed in the interviews and the FGDs: they can support and enable (e.g. removing obstacles or not admitting obstacles), motivate (e.g. through appreciation) and exemplify cooperation.[18].

How much cooperation do I demand and what kind of cooperation do I want? That does

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[18] The aspect of having a past life was mentioned in the FGD and interviews, especially with regard to the fact that not having a past life is a hindrance.

Appreciation: From an aggregated perspective, appreciation is also one of the most important factors influencing cooperation. This strong influence has been statistically proven. In the FGDs, appreciation was particularly related to the role of the manager and discussed in terms of praise and trust. For the employees, appreciation has less to do with rewards than with personal recognition. This feedback also confirms the result of the second online survey that rewards generally do not have a strong effect on whether employees develop the intention to work together.

Career aspirations: The influence of career aspirations on cooperation also has a statistically noticeable effect, although not as strong as management or appreciation. This underlines that most employees see collaboration as career-enhancing and that the potential internal competition that can arise from their own career aspirations is not at the expense of collaboration. In the FGDs, some employees argued that people with a strong desire to pursue a career in GIZ are more likely to compete with others and therefore cooperate less. Other employees, however, believed people with career ambitions are more motivated to work together - also in the sense of networking and becoming visible. In this context, the FGD staff differentiated between the quantity and quality of cooperation on the one hand, and between the added value of cooperation for their own careers and the added value for the quality of service provision/effects on the other.

you have to network within your own institution to work well with other people. (FGD, PMI)

Since day one I was told to do certain things to stay in the organization. But nobody sees the implementation of the project. What rewards you is your presence at forums and knowing people. This creates competition for visibility. And it means that a certain type of people stays in the organization: Those that are good in self-marketing. I struggle, because implementation is important to me and I'm not so visible. (FGD, AMA)

Freedom of decision: Even if the freedom to make one's own decisions does not have a strong effect overall, however, there are noticeable effects in the following function groups: AMA and IMA. From the FGDs, this result can be underpinned above all by a so-called reverse conclusion. In many FGDs, the "imposed" coordination loops were listed as an obstacle to cooperation. Here, too, the role of the manager is confirmed: He or she has a decisive influence on the degree of freedom of decision regarding the cooperation of his or her team.

It means that you must go through group leadership and departmental management before you can talk to the colleague next door about a specific topic. (FGD, PMI)

The hierarchical levels, which must be respected at all costs, are very pronounced in order to get to another person in another division. These coordination processes are so lengthy. It is difficult to work with other people from other divisions. (FGD, PMI)

The management literature also sees freedom of choice as a significant factor influencing employee satisfaction and motivation. For example, the Job Characteristics Model by Hackman and Oldham (1975) states that autonomy is an important driver of motivation, satisfaction and work effectiveness. The latest meta-analysis on this by Humphrey, Nahrgang, and Morgeson (2007) confirms this theory. From the FGDs it can be concluded that freedom of decision granted by the manager is perceived as a sign of trust and appreciation and thus motivates people to work together more closely.

Although the workload at GIZ is perceived as high, it does not have a negative impact on cooperation, but even slightly promotes it among AMA and managers.

From the FGD, the interviews and the discussion in the IDA community, the high workload of the employees emerges as one of the most significant negative factors influencing cooperation.

There is rather a negative incentive: Cooperation means overtime. Also, between projects and topics, overtime is the problem. It does not contribute to the achievement of the mission. (FGD, AMA FK)

People drown in work, depend on each other, that's why employees cooperate. FGD, IMA.

The second online survey did not confirm this negative effect of the workload on cooperation. On the contrary: For AMA and for employees with personnel responsibility, a high workload even has a slightly positive effect on cooperation. For AMA, this can be explained based on the FGD by the fact that they can only cope with the

high workload if they cooperate with partners and stakeholders. Employees with personnel responsibility realize that they can only cope with the high workload if they can delegate tasks and if there is cooperation. The fact that the overall workload has hardly any statistical effect on cooperation does not mean that this factor is not important for the company. Merely to answer the question why there are differences between TARGET and ACTUAL in cooperation and how these differences can be reduced, the workload cannot be listed as a reason or essential influencing factor (driver). Other aspects that are not in the focus of this evaluation are certainly affected by the perceived workload, and in the opinion of the evaluation team, resulting concerns should in principle be taken seriously

The following factors have little or no influence on collaboration: The desire for visibility, (constant) staff changes, own networks within the company, as well as mobile working and the availability of digital tools.

Visibility and networks: The aspects of visibility within the company and own networks within the company, which were mostly discussed in connection with career aspirations in the context of the FGD at home and abroad, statistically speaking do not have any effect on cooperation. Since these aspects were very present in the FGDs, yet their effects on cooperation were controversially discussed, positive and negative effects are likely to balance each other: Some employees see cooperation as part of career-promoting networking and as an opportunity to become visible in the company. Others, however, seem to want to achieve visibility by going alone or perceive a shielding by colleagues who strive for visibility.

Visibility is for many the main reason to either work together or not to work together. (FGD, PMI)

Digital tools: While the use of digital tools has no influence on the overall intention to work together, they are a positive factor for employees with personnel responsibility and for NMA. Digital tools to support collaboration were intensively discussed in interviews with managers, the FGD and in the IDA community. Even though the use of digital tools is generally seen as an opportunity to work together more and better, there is criticism that tools/formats are not available, that their use is not permitted or only very limited, that there are uncertainties about what is permitted and that the skills are not sufficient to use the tools in such a way that they contribute to more and better cooperation (one's own or others' "digital literacy").

We have formats that are supposed to promote cooperation, but they don't work, for example sector networks; IDA was also developed without the employees, for example, external partners have no access to it. (FGD, AMA FK)

GIZ introduces new systems – but who uses them? The problem is that GIZ doesn't get rid of the old system. People need to be forced to use the new system, as there is no alternative. (FGD, AMA)

Mobile working: Since mobile working had only recently been introduced abroad and was therefore highly topical within the company, the second online survey examined, among other things, the effect of mobile working on cooperation. In the FGDs, the possibility of mobile working was seen as a sign of the company's or manager's trust in their staff. At the same time, however, mobile working was mentioned by the majority as an obstacle to internal collaboration, or participants in the FGD believed that the digital tools available did not compensate the negative consequences of mobile working on collaboration. The second online survey could not show any effect on collaboration from an aggregated perspective, with the exception of PMI: In this function

group mobile working has a very strong positive effect and is the most important driver for collaboration. This means that the fears and assumptions expressed in the FGD (see quotes) and assumptions could not be confirmed.

Our communication is not good enough for a good cooperation. Mobile working does not make it easier. We don't know when someone is or is not at their place. (FGD, IMA)

Part-time work at head office makes it very difficult for us. And nowadays many also work mobile. They are very hard to reach. (FGD, NMA FK)

Change of personnel and continued employment: The FGD also named constant staff changes and uncertainties about continued employment as obstacles to internal cooperation. Frequent changes in personnel led, for example, to uncertainties regarding contact persons. Also, long-term working relationships characterised by mutual trust could not develop. Uncertainties about continued employment relate to one's own continued employment and to the continued employment of the colleagues with whom one is to work together. According to the FGD, the uncertainty shifts the focus of the person concerned to the search for security - either within the company, i.e. ultimately via an open-ended employment contract, or to a job search outside the company. This would result in a loss of energy and time, which could instead be used for cooperation. However, in the second online survey, hardly any statistical effect on the intention to work together could be proven. Both aspects were examined in the second online survey regarding their effect on cooperation. Only among IMA do uncertainties about continued employment in one's own working environment have a weak positive effect on cooperation. In the FGDs, occasionally an intention to cooperate in order to secure one's own job was confirmed.

Dealing with the open-ended employment contract draws energy from employees who do not yet have it. These employees are very busy being visible, networking for their own career or looking for new jobs. This damages the company. (FGD, PMI)

There is a high perception of unequal development opportunities in the company; but without effect on the cooperation.

The impression created in the FGDs that development opportunities in the company are perceived as unequal (in the FGDs: unfair) was confirmed in the second online survey - but without proving an effect on cooperation, not even in a disaggregated view. The perceived unequal treatment refers to career and development opportunities within GIZ and usually to NMA and EH including, for example, the opportunity of getting an open-ended employment contract and taking up management positions.

In the FGDs, unequal treatment as an obstacle to cooperation was also frequently referred to as lack of appreciation for certain groups of employees, i.e. in some cases it encompasses more than just career opportunities, but also the way colleagues treat each other. This problem was discussed exclusively in the FGDs abroad (including remote FGDs in fragile states) - but here in almost all of them. The "unequal" treatment of NMAs, especially administrative staff, by AMAs and staff of the "head office" in Germany was the main topic of discussion. Even if unequal development opportunities have hardly any statistical effects on cooperation, this does not mean that this factor is not important in the company. Merely to answer the question of why there are differences between TARGET and ACTUAL in cooperation and how these can be reduced, unequal development opportunities cannot be listed as a reason or a significant influencing factor (driver). Other aspects which are not in the focus of this evaluation are affected by the perceived unequal development opportunities, and in the opinion of the evaluation team, resulting concerns should be taken seriously.

> *The cooperation with the GIZ head office is a nightmare. They take themselves so seri-ously. They treat us like second-class citizens. (FGD, NMA FK Fragile States)*

> *La brecha entre la administración y la parte técnica es muy grande. Lo administrativo esta subvalorado. No tenemos las mismas posibilidades. (FGD, NMA Adminisration)[19]*

Competing or non-cooperating commissioners are mentioned in the FGD as obstacles to cooperation.

Another obstacle to internal cooperation among projects stated in FGDs was the fact that the commissioning authorities were themselves in competition with each other (competition between different departments/departments of one commissioning authority). According to the FGD, this competition is passed on to GIZ and cooperation with projects financed by other commissioners is not encouraged. This was discussed both in the FGDs in Germany (in relation to sector projects) and in the FGDs abroad (in relation to other project types). The FGDs named BMZ and BMU in this regard.

> *Projects funded by different Ministries are not allowed to cooperate, e.g. BMZ with BMU. (FGD, AMA)*

> *They are different departments with different interests. Some go to the left and some go to the right, and then our hierarchy stands there and does not know how to deal with it. Then one goes global and the other regional, and then suddenly, they can no longer talk to each other. Then you can't do anything at the working level, otherwise you'll hear from the BMZ that it's not possible. (FGD, PMI)*

> *What makes cooperation in my work more difficult is the proximity to active politics. We are all assigned to specific units in the BMU. Their competition among themselves is simply transferred to the GIZ projects. This is especially true for political consulting pro-jects. (FGD, PMI)*

4.10 What influences competitive behaviour and what does not?

This chapter is also structured according to the most important overall results. The special features that arise for the function groups are listed in the appropriate sections. Furthermore, according to the FGD and in the second online survey, the competition dimension was disaggregated into internal and external competition. This chapter follows this distinction and is thus divided into two parts.

Factors influencing internal competition

As mentioned above, in the FGDs internal competition was mainly related to career opportunities within the company. In Germany and for AMA, this was mostly connected with the topic "visibility" and open-end employment contract; in the FGDs in Germany, competition for resources (especially personnel and internal services) and the competition between commissioners passed on to the GIZ also played a role. In the FGDs, NMAs be-

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[19] Translation: The gap between the administration and the technical part is very large. The administrative part is undervalued. We do not have the same possibilities.

lieved that internal competition was less relevant for them than for AMA. Among NMA, employees with technical tasks were more affected than administrative staff. Internal competition here referred to follow-up contracts at the end of the project and to the "few opportunities for advancement".

FGD: In principle, internal competition was not necessarily assessed negatively - in the FGD as well as in the IDA community, positive aspects such as motivation or competition for the best idea were discussed. However, the general impression was that internal competition was too dominant and/or not sufficiently oriented to have a predominantly positive effect. According to the FGD, the question is therefore "how can we render internal competition inspiring instead of burdening?

> *Competition is good if it is healthy, e.g. we have awards internally between the countries of our regional project, this supports productivity and creativity. (FGD, NMA)*

FGD: In the FGDs, the prevailing opinion was that internal competition was very present, but that this seldom strained personal relations with one another.

> *At personal level, I have very rarely had bad experiences. I'm sure there's low-threshold competition, but in human terms, it's always okay (FDG, PMI)*

Individual targets and equal opportunities for development are the strongest support for internal competitive behaviour. Both have an effect via personal attitude and subjective norms, which are also the most important determinants of behaviour in this dimension (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Factors influencing the competition dimension (internal)

> *Individual targets significantly promote internal competitive behaviour. However, team goals have no influence on this.*

Function groups and individual goals: The extent to which individual goals promote internal competition differs between function groups, but it makes no difference whether employees have personnel responsibility or not, or whether they work in fragile states or not. Individual targets only have a very strong positive effect on PMI; in the case of AMA and NMA, they have a weak effect on internal competition, and in the case of IMA and EH, they have no effect at all.

Region and individual targets: In a regional comparison, Africa differs from the overall result: Individual targets have a weak effect here.

FGD and individual goals: In most FGDs, the importance of individual goals was explicitly mentioned, but this did not reveal a clear picture. Overall, little importance was attached to individual targets per se. In this context, however, the performance assessment system was mentioned (several times and by different function groups), which was considered inappropriate and in which individual goals are set and measured.

Personal goals have little to do with competition. [FGD, AMA FK]

The formulation of objectives - i.e. whether ambitious or not - has nothing to do with competition. (FGD, PMI)

Not the individual goals lead to competition, but the grading system: Because you have to be above average, this creates unhealthy competition. (FGD, NMA Administration)

Performance assessements are intransparent and lack an incentive system that honours good performance and makes it visible. (FGD, IMA)

Team objectives: The second online survey shows that team goals have no influence on whether employees compete with each other. Only in the case of NMA and employees in fragile states do team goals even promote internal competition. This is also the case in Africa, where team goals have a significant impact on internal competition, unlike in other regions. The FGDs provide a possible explanation: In practice, it frequently remains unclear who receives recognition for achieving team goals.

It's the question whether shared goals lead to more cooperation or more competition. If two people work on the same goal – who gets the credit at the end? (FGD, AMA)

FGD and team goals: Also, in the FGD and the IDA community shared goals were discussed. Here, a distinction was made between team goals, division goals or otherwise shared goals, e.g. of several projects within a cluster. In all cases, however, a polarity of cooperation and internal competition became clear, which was not confirmed in the second online survey.

I think, the existing incentive structure (performance goals and acquisition objectives by departments) and the strong identities of departments make cross-departmental collaboration difficult. The executive level often thinks in terms of their departmental objectives first. This leads to a certain degree of competition in-house, which is counterproductive. In my opinion, addressing those two aspects would be key. (IDA, PMI)

Employees clearly reject the hypothesis that "Everyone has the same development opportunities at GIZ".[20] Wherever employees see equal development opportunities, they are more likely to compete.

Equal development opportunities have a significant effect on internal competitive behaviour in the overall result. This means that employees who see equal development opportunities are more likely to compete with each other. Other employees are less likely to see the need to compete.

Functional groups: The influence of equal development opportunities on competitive behaviour is very strong among IMA; among NMA it is significant. While it is still weak among AMA, it is not significant for PMI and EH. Whether employees have personnel responsibility or whether they work in fragile states makes no difference to the result.

Regions: By regional comparison, the effect in Africa is somewhat weaker than in APLAK or EMZ countries.

FGD: Since the FGD argued that equal development opportunities lead to more cooperation, the result of the second online survey was surprising. It can be explained, however, that unequal development opportunities lead to employees not perceiving certain function groups as competitors. For NMA, the FGD provides a further explanation: If there is uncertainty about the extent to which employees have personal development opportunities within the company, competitive behaviour is stimulated.

Cuando no hay una carrera establecida hay competencia. (FGD, NMA Adminstration)[21]

Equal development opportunities have a significant effect on internal competition for financial and human resources, and career aspirations promote internal competition weakly.

Function groups and competition for resources: While competition for financial and human resources has a weak influence on internal competitive behaviour in the overall result, there is no influence among AMA, PMI and EH; in contrast, there is a weak influence among NMA and even a significant influence among IMA. It makes no difference, however, whether employees have personnel responsibility or not; in both groups, competition for financial and personnel resources has a weak effect on internal competitive behaviour.

Regions and resource competition: If the results are disaggregated by region, differences become visible. In non-fragile countries and in the APLAK region, competition for financial and human resources has a significant effect on internal competition. In the EMZ the effect is weak, in Africa it is not statistically detectable.

FGD and competition for resources: Competition for resources was discussed in the FGDs regarding competition for staff and internal services (e.g. IT). Financial resources, such as budget allocations, seem less significant. The funds from the BMU's International Climate Initiative (ICI), for which various GIZ projects are applying, are an exception.

Reason for this note: In my opinion, the discrepancy between ACTUAL and TARGET in the competition dimension is due to the scarce human resources. This creates pressure, competition and conflict potential. This is my explanation for competition between managers. (FGD, IMA)

I experience competition at the Berlin office. It starts with the question 'how do I get an office'? At GloBe people are piling up. Where do I do my work? In many countries ELVIS is behind schedule with its contracts. Good access to individuals gives me what I need to do

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[20] In the MEB 2019 the statement "In GIZ everyone is treated equally fairly and equitably" was rated "rather right".

[21] Translation: If there is no established career path, there is competition.

Function groups and career aspirations: As in the overall result, career aspirations have only a weak effect on internal competition in the case of AMA; in the case of NMA and PMI they have no effect, in the case of EH career aspirations even have a negative effect, i.e. EH with career aspirations tend not to enter into internal competition because, according to the feedback from the FGD, they see no chance of asserting themselves against GIZ employees. Only among IMA do career wishes have a significant effect on internal competition. The results of the online survey also show that personnel responsibility makes a difference whether career wishes lead to internal competition: For employees without personnel responsibility, significant effects were found, while for employees with personnel responsibility, career wishes do not play a role in internal competitive behaviour (no effect).

Regions and career aspirations: In a regional comparison, career aspirations have a significant effect on internal competitive behaviour in APLAK and EMZ, but no effect in Africa.

The perceived high level of uncertainty about continued employment at GIZ does not have the expected effect on internal competition. This also applies to the perception of employees that they must achieve a high level of visibility in order to be successful within the company.

Continued employment: The FGDs gave the impression that the uncertainty about continued employment led to employees competing with each other. Although the second online survey shows that uncertainty about continued employment at GIZ is perceived as high, it has no effect on internal competitive behaviour. There are no regional differences in this result, nor are there any differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility. Of the function groups, AMAs are the only exception in this respect. Here it was shown that the uncertainty about continued employment among AMA even leads to less internal competitive behaviour.

Visibility: Equally present in the FGD and also not confirmed in the second online survey is the issue of visibility. Due to the FGD results, the hypothesis had been formulated here that one has to be visible in the company in order to be successful. The second online survey examined whether employees who agree with this hypothesis are more likely to compete with their colleagues. The results vary widely by function group and region, but the effects are not significant or strong in any of the groups. For example, the perceived importance of visibility tends to make NMA, employees with personnel responsibility and in Africa as a whole more likely to compete internally. Among IMA and in the APLAK region, as well as in non-fragile countries, it leads to less competitive behaviour. In the other function groups and regions, no correlations were found. As mentioned in the context of cooperation, the FGDs show that employees seem to deal very differently with the desire for visibility. While this desire leads some employees to distance themselves and compete, others seek contact with their colleagues and cooperate, possibly in the form of networking.

Factors influencing external competition

As mentioned, the competition dimension was not divided into internal and external competition in the first online survey. The FGD considered the results differentiated according to internal and external competition. Regarding external competition, the result, i.e. the desire for less external competition, was rather not shared. The predominant opinion was that GIZ is only in a very small extent subject to external competition.

External competition is not noticed at all in headquarters. [FGD, PMI]

External competition in the FGDs was mainly related to competition between GIZ and other implementing or-

ganisations for additional funds (keyword: Acquisition of third-party funds/co-financing). Therefore, this was for-mulated as a hypothesis and the connection was examined in the second online survey.

Especially among NMA and EH and in fragile states, external competition for the favour of partners was also discussed.

There is also a competition for the favour of the local partner. The partners know this and can play the organisations off against each other very well. (FGD, FK Fragile States)

Career aspirations promote external competitive behaviour most strongly; they influence all three determinants of behaviour, and most strongly personal attitude (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Factors influencing the competition dimension (external)

Generally, personal career aspirations have the greatest influence on the intention to compete with other or-ganisations.

Generally, personal career aspirations have the greatest influence on the intention to compete with other or-ganisations. From the FGDs, this connection can be explained in such a way that external competition is un-derstood as the acquisition of third-party funds - which in turn is described as career-promoting.

Regions: The effect of career aspirations on external competition is strongest in the region APLAK. However, the effects are also significant in non-fragile countries and in the EMZ region.

Function group: Disaggregated by function group, IMA are the only group with significant effects of career aspirations on external competitive behaviour. Among PMI, EH and in Africa, no correlation between career aspirations and the intention to compete with other organizations could be proven. In all other function groups, the effects are weak, but significant for employees without personnel responsibility.

Individual targets and equal development opportunities increase external competition.

Although with weak effects, individual targets and equal development opportunities lead to employees develop-ing the intention to compete with other organisations.

As with career aspirations, the FGD's approach to the relationship between individual objectives and external competition was primarily based on acquisition targets. While, as mentioned above, external competition tends to be viewed positively in the FGD, the importance attached to acquisition targets is perceived as too strong.

A high workload has a negative impact on external competitiveness, especially for AMA, IMA and FK.

The overall result shows that GIZ employees are less likely to compete with external organisations if they perceive the workload as too heavy.

In the disaggregated view of the results, this is true for AMA, IMA and staff with personnel responsibility as well as in EMZ and non-fragile states. In all other groups no correlation could be found.

4.11 What influences creative behaviour and what does not?

As described above, the FGD distinguished between creativity in technical work and creativity in administration. The above-mentioned controversial discussion about the extent of creativity shows that there are different interpretations of creativity. Employees expressed the wish for more orientation on one hand and more recognition of "small creativity", such as an Excel sheet that makes work easier, on the other hand[22].

What does creativity and innovation actually mean at GIZ? Some of us would certainly need more guidance on what GIZ wants and how we can implement it. (FGD, PMI)

The second online survey shows that managers and their own freedom of decision have the greatest influence on creative action (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Factors influencing the creativity dimension

Managers have a great influence on whether work at GIZ is creative by empowering employees (e.g. giving time, providing tools, etc.).

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[22] In literature, too, the distinction between "small creativity" and "great creativity" is found. Nölke (2015) defines "great creativity" as follows: leads to "fundamental changes": "groundbreaking inventions, new concepts, revaluations, new trends"; "small creativity" does not substantially change the existing: "improvements to the product, work simplifications, modified processes".

Function groups: As in the collaboration dimension, managers have [23] a very large influence on whether creative work is done at GIZ. Of the function groups, IMA and PMI are the groups where this influence is strongest. But for AMA and NMA the influence of managers on creative work is also significant. Only for EH no effect could be proven.

Personnel responsibility: The influence of managers is somewhat stronger among employees without personnel responsibility than among employees with personnel responsibility.

Regions: Disaggregated by region, the influence of managers on creative behaviour is at least significant, in Africa and in non-sustainable countries even very strong.

FDG: Management literature also confirms the important role of managers in creativity. According to Nöllke (2015), for example, employees are most likely to come up with creative ideas when they have access to all the essential information, can exchange ideas and benefit from the experiences of others. The manager can create the framework conditions for this. On the other hand, employees need a protected space in which to develop their ideas undisturbed. This was confirmed in the FGDs: on one hand, the manager was assigned a role to give trust (also regarding the granting of freedom, see below) and appreciation (also: different opinions) and to be tolerant of mistakes. Nöllke (2015), for example, speaks of welcoming creative ideas from the company.

Creative work depends immensely on the manager. Although there is a lot of freedom internally, mistakes are generally not particularly tolerated. (FGD, IMA)

Critical comments hardly ever appear on the intranet. That has changed. Can you still count on a critical attitude or dissenting opinion still being appreciated? The pressure to conform comes from above. (FGD, FK Germany)

FGD: On the other hand, the FGD participants also see the manager as responsible for facilitating the exchange necessary for the development of creative ideas and making time available. The increasing physical distance between team members poses a particular challenge, as the following quote shows:

Teams are in different locations. We rarely get people in the same place. It's culturally a different way of working. It's not an inhibitor of creativity, but you must create connections for spaces. (FGD, FK Germany)

The freedom to make own decisions also has a positive influence on creative work.

Function group: In the overall result, the freedom to make own decisions has a significant influence on whether employees work creatively. This high significance also exists in the disaggregated view of the results, except for PMI and EH and the APLAK region.

FGD: According to the FGD, the manager is seen as having a decisive responsibility in this respect; if this freedom is granted, many participants in the FGD experience additional appreciation and recognition, which is perceived as very motivating.

La capacidad de tomar decisiones en mi propio desempeño – así es como me siento amarado. (FGD, NMA Techn.)[24]

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[23] The hypothesis tested in the online survey is "My manager wants me to be creative in my work".

[24] The opportunity to make decisions about my own performance - this makes me feel valued.

A high workload has a slightly negative effect on creativity.

Function groups: A high workload means that employees are less likely to develop the intention to work creatively, i.e. the effect is negative. However, this influence is weak in the overall result, as it only affects the function group of the development worker, where the influence is high. For AMA, there is even an opposite effect: A high workload promotes creativity. The strong influence among EH is also the reason why a slight effect could be proven for employees without personnel responsibility, i.e. here too the workload lowers the intention to act creatively.

Regions: Disaggregated by region, a slight negative effect was found in non-fragile states and in the APLAK region.

FGD: As mentioned above, the high workload was generally very present in the FGD. Staff members reported that creativity had to take place mainly outside regular working hours, i.e. in the evening or at weekends. Nöllke (2015:112) also describes this as a typical phenomenon; in contrast, "in creative companies fixed times (are reserved) for creative activities. Creativity is not seen as a voluntary extra service of motivated employees who are happy to perform it after work".

5 to 10 minutes per day for reflection – that would be great. (FGD, IMA)

FGD: According to the FGD, this criticised lack of time also has to do with the short duration of the projects, as the following quotation illustrates:

Falta tiempo para la creatividad. Al final la oferta y lo practico priman. Antes el cambio de las fases eran mas lentos. Ahí se tuvo mas tiempo para la creatividad. (FGD, NMA FK)[25]

Rewards can easily lead to more creative work, most likely with PMI and EH.

Function groups: If employees believe that creative work is rewarded, the overall result has a weak positive effect on creativity. Here too, the disaggregated view of the result shows a different picture depending on the function group. Effects are only detectable for development workers, national project staff and staff based in Germany; for EH and PMI they are very strong, for IMA only weak. The strength of the effects for EH and PMI are the reason why they are reflected in the overall result as well as for employees without personnel responsibility. For employees with personnel responsibility the effects are not verifiable.

Regions: If the results are disaggregated by region, weak effects are visible for non-fragile states as well as for the regions Africa and EMZ.

FGD: In the FGDs, it was often reported that creativity in the company was not rewarded and that no praise or recognition was given for creative work. On one hand, this was because the efforts were not seen as sufficient and the results, i.e. the ideas, were not sufficiently taken up.

At the sectoral department, there is room for creativity, but in the end, it does not continue and peters out, which is frustrating. Many good ideas and project innovations get thus lost.

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[25] There is not enough time for creativity. In the end the offer and the practice prevail. In the past, phase changes were not so frequent. There was more time for creativity.

It is difficult to reward creativity, how? (FGD, FK Fragile States)

FGD: On the other hand, rewarding creativity was often discussed in connection with a lack of appreciation for other perspectives and a lack of acceptance of failures, which are an integral part of creative work. Thus, it is not only a question of what is rewarded, but also of what is punished/sanctioned.

For some people, creative work poses a risk. What is to be gained at GIZ? Actually, you can only loose. (FGD, PMI)

The following factors have no influence on the overall result but have a significant or very positive effect on certain groups: Lengthy internal decision-making processes, fixed structures and procedures, digital tools.

Some factors that have no influence in the overall result have a significant or even very strong influence on creative action in selected function groups or in certain regions.

Decision-making processes: For example, (time-consuming) decision-making processes among IMA promote creativity. According to the feedback from the FGD, long decision-making processes hinder work processes. However, since the latter must continue in some cases (even without decisions), it is necessary to become creative.

I believe there is a difference between global and sector projects. I work in a global project and feel very free to create. Sectoral projects appear more restricted because they are so close to the ministries. (FGD, PMI)

Structures and processes: Fixed structures and processes have a very strong positive effect on creative work among PMI; weak effects can also be found among NMA. In some FGDs, the opinion was expressed that efficient work during routine activities frees up "space" that can be used for creative work.

Clear rules allow to make room for creativity. I do not have to think about what is right and what is wrong. (FGD, NMA Administration)

Digital tools: Digital tools only have a significant influence on EH and in the APLAK region whether these groups develop the intention to work creatively. For NMA and for employees with personnel responsibility, the effect is weak, as in fragile states and the EMZ region. Among IMA the availability of digital tools even reduces creativity.

4.12 What has influence on control and what does not?

The results of the first online survey were presented and discussed in the FGD. The participants made some differentiations in the control dimension in the FGDs. The distinction between the use of standardised guidelines (standardisation for greater efficiency) and the observance of rules (compliance requirements for a federal enterprise) was included in the second online survey due to the intensity of the FGDs and queried separately.

> *It should not be about more or less control or rules, but about better quality. We are still very bad at that. (FGD, FK Germany)*

Overall, the acceptance of "classical control" regarding commercial tasks in the FGDs was very high. Regarding the control of substantive tasks, the discussion was rather controversial and ranged from "too little", "none available" to "too much". If negative examples of control of technical tasks were mentioned, this mostly concerned micro-management by the manager.

> *In finance, I'm glad to be controlled. I don't feel so much control. (FGD, AMA FK)*

Factors influencing the use of standardized guidlines

On one hand, standardization was discussed in the FGDs in relation to increased efficiency; on the other hand, employees stated that this standardization provided them security.

> *Control sounds very negative. But it also gives me security that I am on the right track - especially when I started at GIZ. (FGD, PMI)*
>
> *The GIZ control culture is extremely helpful to us. The work is not as chaotic as in other organisations. It gives us a common language. This is very helpful especially in times of crisis. (FGD, NMA Fragile States)*
>
> *Formalized processes give a rough outline, I find that rather helpful. This leads to efficiency. (FGD, PMI)*
>
> *Does control really increase efficiency? It depends on the situation: in communication with the BMU, yes. Reacting quickly with consulting services, no. (FGD, AMA FK)*

The second online survey shows that well-founded rules and the control of individual work steps by the manager promote the use of standardised guidelines most strongly - in both cases to a large extent via personal attitude (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Factors influencing the control dimension (standardised guidelines)

The control of all work steps by the managers has a great influence.

Even though micromanagement by the manager in the FGD was criticized by many participants, the results of the second online survey show that control by the manager as to whether guidelines are applied has a great influence on whether they are actually used.

Function groups: Among EH the influence of managerial control is very strong, among IMA and NMA only weak, among AMA and PMI no effect at all could be proven. Whether employees have personnel responsibility or not, has no effect on the result.

Regions: The regions also differ in this factor. In APLAK, the effect of managerial control is significant, in Africa and EMZ only weak. In fragile states, managerial control has a stronger influence on the use of standardised guidelines than in non-fragile states.

Well-founded rules promote efficient work based on standardised guidelines.

If the rules are well-founded, this promotes efficient work based on standardised guidelines. In combination with managerial control, this has the greatest influence on the use of standardised guidelines.

Function groups: This applies most strongly to EH and AMA; well-founded rules have the greatest influence in these function groups. Only for PMI this influence could not be proven.

Personnel responsibility: For employees without personnel responsibility this influence is somewhat stronger than for employees with personnel responsibility.

Regions: In all regions the positive influence of well-founded rules could be observed, but they differ in the strength of this influence: In APLAK the effect is very strong, in EMZ somewhat weaker and in Africa only weak. The effect is stronger in fragile states than in non-fragile ones.

FGD: Even though the understanding of the necessary set of rules for GIZ was in principle high in the FGD, staff members also want to see a sense in the application of individual rules. FGD participants stated that this was not always the case. In the FGDs, employees expressed the wish to have an explanation as to why a rule should be applied.

If rules are known and if they are clear and transparent, the use of standardised guidelines is weakly influenced.

Function groups and known rules: Known rules have only a weak influence on the use of standardized guidelines across function groups, but among EH and PMI they have none. Only for employees with personnel responsibility a significant effect could be proven.

Regions and known rules: Only in fragile states, a significant influence of known rules was determined, disaggregated by region.

Function groups and clear rules: Clear and transparent rules have very different effects on the use of standardized guidelines in the function groups. For NMA the influence is significant, for IMA weak, for AMA and PMI no influence could be proven, and for EH clear and transparent rules even reduce the use of standardised guidelines (strongly negative). Personnel responsibility has no influence on the result.

Regions and clear rules: Of all regions, only in EMZ clear and transparent rules have any influence at all on the use of standardised guidelines, and here too the influence is usually only weak. However, it makes a difference whether employees work in fragile states or not. While influence is not demonstrable in fragile states, it is significant in non-fragile states.

FGD: In the FGD, it was expressed that the GIZ regulations are not always perceived as clear and transparent. Employees also expressed uncertainty as to whether they are familiar with the rules in their most recent version. For example, it was critisized that new rules were often not or poorly communicated and therefore reached the employees late and by chance. It is also not always clear whether old rules continue to exist or have been replaced.

Another driver for the use of standardised guidelines are sufficient digital tools/software.

Function groups: An equally weak driver for the use of standardized guidelines in the overall result is the availability of sufficient digital tools/software. These play a particular role for IMA with regard to the use of standardised guidelines. For AMA and NMA the effect is weak. Whether employees have personnel responsibility or not has no influence on the result.

Regions: In all regions, at least weak effects could be demonstrated, in APLAK even significant effects. The fragility of the countries where employees work has no impact on the result.

The commercial processes are not up to date in GIZ. Excel, Excel, Excel… (FGD, PMI)

For selected groups, identification with GIZ and acceptance of accountability has a strong influence on whether they use standardized guidelines.

Function groups: Identification with GIZ and acceptance of accountability have a strong influence on NMA, EH and PMI using standardised guidelines. For all other function groups, no correlation could be demonstrated.
Regions: Among the regions, the effect is strong only in APLAK. In Africa it is small.
FGD: In the FGDs, this correlation was often discussed, and the two factors were also seen in strong relation to each other.

The reason for having our O&R is that we spend German taxpayers' money. Therefore, we need a lot of control. (FGD, NMA FK)

We are a not-for-profit organization; we are answerable to the German public. Controls are necessary, we don't have a profit to show our success. (FGD, NMA Administration)

The company should better explain to its employees what kind of company it is: Public money, accountability. (FGD, AMA FK)

The focus on standardised processes and time-consuming internal decision-making processes prevent selected groups from working according to standardised guidelines.

Function groups and standardized processes: While IMA and EH believe that the focus on standardised processes is strong, other GIZ employees feel even more more deterred by standardised processes and tend to develop less of an intention to work according to standardised guidelines. This is also reflected in the disaggregated results for employees without personnel responsibility and for employees in fragile states.
Function groups and elaborate decision-making processes: Even (time-consuming) internal decision-making processes have no influence on the intention of most employees to use standardised guidelines, except for AMA and employees with personnel responsibility. This negative effect is also evident for the Africa region.

Factors influencing compliance with rules

The fact that many employees identify with GIZ as a federal enterprise is a strong driver for following rules.

Overall, identification with GIZ has the greatest influence on whether employees develop the intention to follow rules. Although a comparatively large number of influences were identified, all of them have only weak effects (see Figure 13).

Figure 13: Factors influencing the control dimension (follow rules)

Function groups: Looking at the individual function groups, the effect of identification with GIZ is particularly strong among EH and significant among AMA and IMA. Whether employees are responsible for personnel is not important here.

Regions: In the regions APLAK and EMZ the effect of identification with GIZ is significant, in Africa even very strong. Whether employees work in fragile states makes a slight difference: The effect is somewhat stronger in fragile states.

FGD: In the FGDs, identification with GIZ was often discussed in connection with the associated acceptance of accountability and the resulting high compliance requirements. Both factors have a great influence on the fact that rules are followed (see below).

> *If employees accept the accountability of GIZ, they are more likely to follow the rules associated with it.*

Function groups: The correlation is particularly pronounced for AMA and PMI (very strong), but the effects are also significant for all other function groups. This effect is somewhat stronger for employees without personnel responsibility.

Regions: A regional comparison shows that the effect is strongest in APLAK; it is only weak in EMZ and Africa. State fragility also makes a difference: Whether employees in fragile states follow rules depends largely on their acceptance of GIZ accountability, but in non-fragile states the effect is weak.

FGD: The great importance of accepting the accountability of GIZ for compliance with rules confirms the result of the FGD. The necessity of high compliance requirements was generally emphasized here, although it was criticized by some that narrow-mindedness or a too strong focus on minor rules perceived as unimportant compared to technical control, as the quote below shows.

> *Control must be high because we work with taxpayers' money. But there are wrong priorities in GIZ. A wrongly filled out travel expense report causes more stress than the non-fulfilment of indicators. (FGD, PMI)*

FGD: Criticism was also expressed about access to information regarding the rules, the comprehensibility/clarity and the communication of the rules. This was also checked in the second online survey, and the results are presented below.

Knowledge of the GIZ rules, clear and transparent rules, and the justification of rules have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules.

Function groups and knowledge of the rules: Knowledge of the rules is important for all function groups in terms of whether they follow the rules or not. However, EH are an exception: Here no effects can be proven.
Personnel responsibility and knowledge of the rules: Whether employees have personnel responsibility has an effect on the result: Knowledge of the rules is somewhat more important for employees with personnel responsibility than for the comparison group.
Regions: Comparing the regions, Africa differs from the APLAK and EMZ regions: While in the latter the influence of knowledge is very high, it is only weak in Africa. On the other hand, the fragility of the states makes no difference.

New processes and forms are constantly being created. The efficiency and effectiveness of control is therefore not particularly high. (FGD, PMI)

Function groups and clear rules: Desaggregated by functional groups, the influence of unambiguous and transparent rules is weak among NMA and IMA, but not detectable in other function groups.
Personnel responsibility and clear rules: Whether rules are unambiguous and transparent is particularly important for employees with personnel responsibility.
Regions and clear rules: In a regional comparison, clear and transparent rules for employees in Africa and EMZ have a significant influence on whether they follow rules or not. In APLAK no correlation could be found. Here too, the fragility of the states makes no difference.
Function groups and well-founded rules: A disaggregation by function group does not reveal any striking differences in the justification of rules; their effect is always weak.
Personnel responsibility and well-founded rules: For employees with personnel responsibility, a significant effect has been demonstrated; for employees without personnel responsibility, the effect is weak.
Regions and clear rules: In APLAK and EMZ the influence of well-founded rules is also significant, but weak in Africa. The fragility of the states also makes no difference.
FGD: As already described in the chapter on the use of standardized guidelines, the FGD expressed a fundamental will to follow rules. Knowing and understanding the rules was seen by employees as a basic requirement for a successful business. This is impeded, however, by the way rules and regulations are accessible, communicated and justified. Employees often have the impression that the set of rules changes frequently and that these changes are not sufficiently communicated. For example, there is uncertainty as to whether one is familiar with the latest version; moreover, it is difficult to become "procedurally secure" this way.

It is difficult for us national staff to understand some of the regulatory decisions. Communication is poor. (FGD, NMA)

With all these rules, there is actually no chance of becoming procedurally secure. (FGD, EH)

The manager, the availability of digital tools/software, the focus on standardized processes and elaborate decision-making processes have an influence on whether employees follow rules or not.

Manager: Interestingly, if the manager knows the rules and controls compliance, a significant influence of the manager on whether employees follow rules could be identified, especially for employees who have personnel responsibilities.

Digital tools: If sufficient digital tools and software are available, this will have a significant impact on compliance, especially for EH and employees in Africa and APLAK. Weak effects have also been demonstrated for NMA and IMA, as well as for employees in EMZ.

Decision-making processes: If internal decision-making processes are perceived as (time) consuming, then EH in particular but also AMA tend to follow the rules less. This negative effect has also been demonstrated for employees with personal responsibility. In a regional comparison, this relation affects employees in APLAK and EMZ.

Standardized processes: AMA, IMA and especially EH are affected by a focus on standardized processes in their ability to follow rules. This relation can also be demonstrated for the EMZ region and for non-fragile states. For NMA, employees with personnel responsibility, and in the Africa region, the effect is opposite: For these groups, the focus on standardised processes promotes compliance.

I used to work in the NGO sector. In comparison, I also enjoy the structured and standardized processes for the staff of this large company. It helps to fit in. You don't just leave the staff to themselves. It is worth a lot, also to introduce creative things. (FGD, PMI)

PART C: What options does GIZ have?

> The following central question constitutes the focus of this results section:
>
> - What options does GIZ have to reduce discrepancies in the cultural dimensions assessed between the status perceived and desired by employees?

This chapter outlines the options for GIZ to reduce discrepancies between the TARGET and ACTUAL culture. The listing of these options in this evaluation report does not mean that GIZ does not already implement such measures in these cultural dimensions. At this point, the evaluation team does not make any recommendations either. This chapter rather presents the drivers which, based on statistical analysis, have the potential to reduce the discrepancies between TARGET and ACTUAL in the cultural dimensions.

Due to the heterogeneity of the results obtained in the respective function groups and the importance of managers in the GIZ, options are listed that have the potential to reduce the discrepancies between TARGET and ACTUAL, both in the respective function groups and for employees with personnel responsibility.

Since the regional differences in terms of the identified drivers are negligible and it is fundamentally unrealistic to formulate generally valid options for entire regions, it was decided together with the Evaluation Unit to include the main drivers in the respective regions in the appendix rather than in the main text. A detailed list of all influencing factors can be found in Annex V.

4.13 Options in the cooperation dimension

> *In the cooperation dimension, the behaviour of most GIZ employees is determined above all by their personal attitude and whether they feel empowered.*

In comparison to the overall result, PMI and EH are an exception regarding the significance of behavioural determinants: here the subjective norm plays a significant role. The most important drivers are leadership, appreciation, own career aspirations and freedom of choice.

Differences between function groups

Among **AMA** the intention to work together is significantly influenced by the personal attitude. The perceived behaviour control has a somewhat weaker influence; the subjective norm has no influence on the intention to cooperate. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, the **freedom to make one's own decisions** is in principle the most important driver for cooperation, followed by the **perceived appreciation** and **whether the manager wants the employees to work together**. A weak influence on cooperation is exerted by one's own career aspirations, a high workload and the perceived strong focus on standardized processes within the company.

Among **IMA**, the intention to work together is significantly influenced by personal attitude as well as by perceived behaviour control. Due to significant effects on both behavioural determinants, the **freedom to make one's own decisions**, **leadership** and **appreciation** are in principle the most important drivers for cooperation. A weak influence on cooperation is exerted by one's own career aspirations, standardised processes, own networks and uncertainty about continued employment. Rules for cross-sectoral collaboration have a negative effect on collaboration in this function group.

Among **NMA**, the intention to work together is significantly influenced by the personal attitude. The perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker influence on the intention to cooperate. Due to significant effects on personal attitude, the **freedom to make one's own decisions** as well as **managers** are in principle the most important drivers for cooperation. A weak influence on collaboration is caused by career aspirations, appreciation, availability of digital tools, high workload, standardized processes and rewards.

> If one wishes to promote cooperation more strongly among AMA, IMA and NMA (focus only on strong effects),
> - they could in principle be given more freedom to make their own decisions; this freedom would mean that AMA, IMA and NMA - according to the statistical results - would work together more;
> - managers could explicitly demand cooperation; for this they would have to
>   - create incentives (e.g. team goals whose achievement is rewarded) or articulate appreciation towards the employee(s), especially regarding cooperation, in order to influence personal attitudes according to the results, or
>   - influence perceived behavioural control, empower or enable employees to work together more (e.g. by allowing more time for collaboration).

Among **PMI**, the intention to work together is significantly influenced by personal attitude and subjective norm. Due to very strong effects on both behavioural determinants, **mobile working** is the most important driver for cooperation - an aspect that has no effect in any other functional group. **Managers** have a somewhat weaker, but nevertheless significant influence on cooperation.

> To promote cooperation among PMI (only focus on the strong effects),
> - mobile working should be encouraged to a greater extent in this function group;
> - managers could explicitly demand cooperation; for this they would have to
>   - create incentives to influence personal attitudes according to the results (e.g. team goals whose achievement is rewarded) or appreciate mobile working
>   - influence the subjective norm, convey that cooperation is very important and that cooperation has an influence on the performance assessment of employees.

Among **EH**, the intention to cooperate is influenced by subjective norm and the perceived behavioural control. Due to very strong effects on the perceived behavioural control, **appreciation** and **leadership** are in principle the most important drivers for cooperation.

> To promote cooperation more strongly among EH (focus only on the strong effects),
> - managers could explicitly demand cooperation; for this they would have to
>   - influence the subjective norm, convey that cooperation is very important to them and above all that it is valued (the appreciation must, however, be communicated, otherwise the opposite effect may result);
>   - influence the perceived behavioural control, enable EH to cooperate more (e.g. facilitate access to information).

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

For **employees with personnel responsibility**, the intention to work together is influenced by the **perceived behavioural control**. The personal attitude has only a weak effect on the intention to work together. In this function group there is a comparatively high number of drivers, but they have only a weak effect on the intention to work together. The drivers that have the greatest effect are those that work through perceived behavioural control, such as **leadership**, **freedom of choice** (working both through perceived behavioural control as well as personal attitude), **digital tools**, and **clear responsibilities** and **interfaces**. Slightly weaker drivers are high workload, career aspirations and appreciation. In contrast to employees with personnel responsibility, the intention of **employees without personnel responsibility** to work together is significantly influenced by their

personal attitude. The perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker influence on the intention to work together. Due to significant effects on personal attitude and perceived behavioural control, **leadership** and **appreciation** are in principle the most important drivers for cooperation. The intention to work together has a weak influence on one's own career aspirations, standardized processes and freedom of decision.

> To promote cooperation more strongly among employees with personnel responsibility (focusing on the strong effects),
> - they could in principle be given more freedom to make their own decisions; this freedom would - according to the statistical results - lead to more cooperation among them;
> - their managers could explicitly demand cooperation; for this they would have to
>   - create incentives to influence personal attitudes according to the results (e.g. team goals whose achievement is rewarded) or
>   - influence the perceived behavioural control, enable or empower employees with personnel responsibility to work together more (e.g. by allowing more time for collaboration) or define clear responsibilities and interfaces;
> - the provision of digital tools that facilitate collaboration could have a positive effect.

4.14 Options in the competition dimension

Internal competition

> *Internal competitive behaviour is significantly influenced both by the personal attitude of employees and by what others think.*

The internal competitive behaviour is significantly influenced both by the personal attitude of the employees and by what others think (subjective norm). **Individual targets** and **equal development opportunities** have the greatest impact - both promote internal competition, both through personal attitude and subjective norms. Weak drivers are career desires and competition for resources.

Differences between function groups

For **AMA**, the intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by the personal attitude. The subjective norm and the perceived behavioural control influence this intention somewhat less. The strongest effect in this group is the **appreciation of high-quality work** - this leads to less internal competition (negative effect). The most important drivers of the overall result, i.e. individual targets and equal development opportunities as well as own career aspirations and fixed-term contracts, only have a weak effect. The latter has a negative effect on the intention to compete with colleagues.

> If AMA are supposed to reduce internal competition (only focus on the strong effects),
> - especially appreciation regarding the quality of their performance could be communicated to influence personal attitudes (no appreciation automatically leads to greater competition).

For **NMA**, the intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by personal attitude and subjective norms. The perceived behavioural control only slightly influences this intention. Due to a significant effect on the subjective norm, **equal development opportunities** are in principle the most important driver for this intention. A range of several other drivers has only weak effects on the intention to compete with colleagues.

> If internal competitive behaviour is to be promoted among NMA (focus only on the strong effects),
> - measures could be taken to align the development opportunities between NMA and AMA
>   - o to strengthen the personal attitude, e.g. through open job advertisements, equal chances in job placement or
>   - o to increase the subjective norm, e.g. through communication by the board of directors and/or other managers, that more national managers are wanted
>
> (Unequal development opportunities perceived by NMA automatically lead to resignation and less internal competition).

As with NMA, **IMA's** intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by personal attitude and subjective norm. The perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker influence on this intention. Due to a very strong effect on the personal attitude and a significant effect on the subjective norm, **equal development opportunities** are in principle the most important driver for the intention to compete internally, followed by own career wishes and competition for financial and personnel resources. The need to be visible in GIZ and good working conditions have a negative effect on the intention to compete with colleagues. Among NMA, these two drivers had weakly positive effects.

> If internal competitive behaviour shall be promoted among IMA (focus only on strong effects)
> - measures could be taken to convince IMA that there are equal development opportunities in the company, e.g. to increase the personal attitude through transparent job allocation or to increase the subjective norm by encouraging IMA to apply for higher positions.
>
> (Unequal development chances perceived by IMA automatically lead to resignation and to less internal competition).

Among **PMI** - as among AMA - the intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by the personal attitude. The subjective norm influences this intention somewhat less. Due to very strong effects on the personal attitude and subjective norm, **individual targets** and **increasing the reputation of GIZ** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention

> To promote internal competitive behaviour (focus only on strong effects) among PMI, the following could be used to influence the personal attitude:
> - Formulate individual (success) goals, because PMI do not shy away from competitive situations to achieve these goals - on the contrary, they even seek the competitive situation (goals could also have the opposite effect if they are formulated in such a way that competition is not at all wanted)
> - Take measures which aim to increase the reputation of GIZ, because PMI feel motivated to contribute to increasing the reputation of GIZ.

Among **EH** the intention to compete with colleagues is also significantly influenced by the personal attitude. The perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker influence on this intention. Due to very strong effects on the perceived behavioural control, the most important drivers for this intention are in principle **the increase of the reputation of GIZ** and **efforts to gain the partners' favour**. Frequent personnel changes have a somewhat weaker influence on this intention. **Own career aspirations** have a **strong negative** effect on their intention to compete with colleagues.

To encourage internal competition among EH (focus only on strong effects),
- measures could be taken to enhance the reputation of GIZ, because EH feel motivated to contribute to increasing the reputation of GIZ;
- measures could be taken to influence perceived behavioural control by making it easier for EH to win the favour of partners, e.g. faster access to financial resources, higher decision-making powers.

(Because of the unequal development opportunities perceived by EH, career aspirations lead to EH not even trying to enter into an internal competition situation. They then more likely leave GIZ).

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

For **employees with personnel responsibility**, the intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by personal attitude and subjective norm. Due to significant effects on personal attitude and subjective norm, **individual objectives** and **equal development opportunities** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention - i.e. they correspond to the overall result. While competition for financial and human resources and visibility have a weak positive effect, the **high workload** has a **negative** effect on the intention to compete with colleagues. In terms of behavioural determinants, **employees without personnel responsibility** do not differ from employees with personnel responsibility. There are also no differences regarding the most important drivers: Due to significant effects on personal attitude and subjective norm, **individual targets** and **equal development opportunities** are in principle the most important drivers. In contrast to employees with personnel responsibility, their **own career aspirations** play an important role; the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect (competition for resources) or none.

To promote internal competitive behaviour among employees with personnel responsibility (focus only on strong effects), personal attitudes could be influenced by
- Formulating individual (success) goals, because these employees do not shy away from competitive situations in order to achieve these goals - on the contrary, they even seek the competitive situation (goals could have the opposite effect if formulated in such a way that competition is not wanted)
- Taking measures to convince these employees that there are equal opportunities for development in the company, e.g. to increase personal attitude by transparent job allocation or to raise the subjective norm by encouraging people to apply for higher positions.

External competition

Regarding external competition, the behaviour of most GIZ employees is strongly influenced by all three determinants.

Regarding external competition, the behaviour of most GIZ employees is strongly influenced by all three determinants. Overall, **career aspirations** are the most important driver, acting on all three behavioural determinants, but most strongly on personal attitude. Individual objectives (personal attitude) and equal development opportunities (perceived behavioural control) have a weak impact. A high workload has a negative effect (personal attitude).

Differences between function groups

For **AMA**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and the perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude influences this intention somewhat less. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, **individual targets** are in principle the most important driver for

this intention. While team goals, equal development opportunities, career aspirations and increasing the reputation of GIZ have only a weak effect on the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations, the **high workload** and especially **appreciation** have a **negative** effect on this intention.

For promoting external competition among AMA (focus only on strong effects),
- to influence personal attitude, an option is to communicate above all appreciation towards the employee(s) regarding the quality of their performance;
- individual (success) goals could be formulated, because these employees do not shy away from external competitive situations in order to achieve these goals - on the contrary, they even seek the competitive situation (goals could also have the opposite effect if formulated in such a way that competition is not desired).

For **NMA**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and the perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude influences this intention somewhat less. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude and the subjective norm, **competition for financial and human resources** is in principle the most important driver for this intention. Team goals, individual objectives, career aspirations and good working conditions, on the other hand, have only a weak effect on the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations.

To encourage external competition among NMA (focus only on strong effects),
- the importance of financial and human resources for GIZ could be continuously communicated to influence the subjective norm;
- measures could be taken to influence perceived behaviour control, which facilitate competition for financial and personnel resources, e.g. higher decision-making powers, more autonomous work, etc.

For **IMA**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to a significant effect on the subjective norm, **personal career aspirations** are in principle the most important driver for this intention. While these drivers have only a weak effect on the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations, the **high workload**, **visibility** and **good working conditions** have a **negative** effect on this intention.

To promote external competitive behaviour among IMA (focus only on strong effects),
- to influence personal attitudes, a pathway could be outlined how IMA can advance in GIZ through external competition;
- to influence the subjective norm, application for higher positions could be encouraged;
- the company could consider reducing the workload for this function group so that they embrace external competition.

For **PMI**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. Due to a significant effect on perceived behavioural control, **increasing GIZ's reputation** is the only driver of this intention.

To promote external competitive behaviour among PMI (focus only on strong effects),
- measures could be taken to enhance the reputation of GIZ, because PMI feel motivated to contribute to increasing the reputation of GIZ.

In the case of **EH**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and the perceived behaviour control. Due to very strong effects on the perceived behavioural control, **frequent changes of personnel** and the **appreciation of work** are the only drivers for this intention.

To encourage external competition among EH (focus only on strong effects),
- to influence the perceived behaviour control, appreciation of the quality of their performance could be communicated and additionally expressed in the form of confidence-building measures that facilitate external competition, e.g. budget sovereignty, decision-making powers, etc.

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

In both groups, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by all behavioural determinants. For **employees with personnel responsibility**, only drivers with weak positive effects could be identified; a **high workload**, however, has a **(strong) negative** effect on this intention. For **employees without personnel responsibility**, their **own career aspirations** are the most important driver for this intention; through significant effects on all behavioural determinants.

To encourage external competitive behaviour among employees with personnel responsibility (focus only on strong effects),
- the company could try to reduce the workload for employees with personnel responsibility, so that they can find the time to enter into external competition.

4.15 Options in the creativity dimension

In GIZ, the intention to work creatively is decisively influenced by whether the employee want to be creative or whether they consider themselves capable of working creatively.

In the overall result, the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. In comparison to the other dimensions, few drivers were identified. The most important drivers are **managers**; they have a very strong effect through perceived behavioural control and a significant effect through personal attitude. This is followed in importance by the **freedom to make one's own decisions** (perceived behavioural control). Rewards also work through perceived behaviour control but are a weak driver for the intention to work creatively. A high workload tends to discourage employees from being creative.

Differences between function groups

For **AMA** the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. Due to significant effects on perceived behavioural control and personal attitude, **managers** are in principle the most important driver for creative work (although weaker than in the overall result), followed by the **freedom to make their own decisions**. A high workload and rewards have a weak influence on creative work.
NMA do not differ from AMA in terms of the most important drivers, but only in drivers with weak effects. In this function group the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. Due to significant effects on perceived behaviour control and personal attitude, **managers** are in principle the most important driver for creative work, followed by the **freedom to make their own decisions**. A weak influence on creative work is exerted by rule-compliant work, fixed structures and processes and the availability of digital tools.

> To promote creative work among AMA and NMA (focus only on strong effects),
> - they could in principle be given more freedom to make their own decisions; this freedom would make the AMA and NMA - according to the statistical results - more creative;
> - managers could explicitly demand creativity; for this they would have to
>   - create incentives (e.g. motivation, appreciation, responsiveness to individual wishes) to influence personal attitudes, or
>   - influence perceived behavioural control, by enabling or empowering employees to be more creative (e.g. by allowing more time for creativity).

For **IMA** the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. Due to the very strong effect on perceived behaviour control, **managers** are in principle the most important driver for creative work in this group as well. Slightly weaker effects were observed for more elaborate decision-making processes and freedom to make decisions. Working according to rules and the availability of digital tools even have a negative effect on the intention to work creatively.

> - Managers could explicitly demand creativity; in order to do so, they would have to enable employees to work more creatively (e.g. by granting freedom of choice and more time for creativity) in order to influence the perceived behavioural control.

PMI differ somewhat more from the above-mentioned groups in terms of drivers and the significance of behavioural determinants - it is the only function group in which the subjective norm is important in this dimension. In this function group the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by the perceived behavioural control and the subjective norm. The personal attitude has a somewhat weaker effect on the intention. Due to very strong effects on the perceived behavioural control and subjective norm, **standardised structures and processes** are in principle the most important driver for creative work. According to the FGD, this can be explained by the fact that not much energy has to be invested into functioning processes, thus leaving more time for creativity. Furthermore, **managers** and **rewards** are other important drivers. Working in accordance with rules and high-pressure regarding outflow of funds even have a negative effect on the intention to work creatively.

> To push creative work among PMI (focus only on strong effects),
> - PMI could be involved in work processes that are characterized by standardised procedures in order to influence perceived behavioural control, so that PMI have sufficient time to be creative;
> - managers could explicitly demand creativity; for this they would have to
>   - communicate the importance of creativity and
>   - offer rewards for creative work.

For **EH** the intention to work creatively is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. With a very strong effect on perceived behavioural control, rewards are in principle the most important driver for creative work, followed by **digital tools**. A **high workload** and **equal development opportunities** for all employees and EH even have a **negative** effect on the intention to work creatively.

> To promote creative work among EH (only focus on the strong effects),
> - rewards for creative work could be offered to influence personal attitudes;
> - digital tools could be made available to influence perceived behavioural control, which could allow time for creative work.

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

For both employees with and without personnel responsibility, the intention to work creatively is influenced by personal attitude and perceived behavioural control. In both groups, significant effects on personal attitudes and perceived behavioural control make **managers** in principle the most important driver for creative work. For **employees with personnel responsibilit**y, **freedom of choice** is also a significant driver. The availability of digital tools and equal development opportunities have a weak impact. For **employees without personnel responsibility**, the high workload even has a negative effect on the intention to work creatively.

> To encourage creative work among employees with personnel responsibility (focus only on strong effects),
> - they could in principle be given more freedom to make their own decisions; this freedom would - according to the statistical results - automatically make them more creative;
> - managers could explicitly demand creativity; for this they would have to
>   - create incentives (e.g. motivation, appreciation, responsiveness to individual wishes) to influence personal attitude, or
>   - influence perceived behavioural control, enable or empower employees to be more creative (e.g. by allowing more time for creativity).

4.16 Options in the control dimension

Efficient work

> *At GIZ, the intention to work efficiently according to standardised guidelines is significantly influenced by the personal attitude and whether one is basically capable of doing so.*

Regarding efficient work based on standardised guidelines, the behaviour of most GIZ employees is influenced by all three determinants, with personal attitude and perceived behavioural control having the greatest impact. Of the five drivers identified, **well-founded rules** and **managerial control** are the most important. Both have a significant effect through personal attitude and a weak effect through subjective norm. Clear and transparent rules, knowledge of the rules and the availability of digital tools/software have a weak effect on the intention to work according to standardised guidelines.

Differences between function groups

Among **AMA**, the intention to work efficiently based on standardised guidelines is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, **well-founded rules** are in principle the most important driver for this intention. While the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect on the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines, time-consuming internal decision-making processes have a negative effect on this intention.

> If the use of standardised guidelines should be promoted among AMA (focus only on strong effects)
> - rules for this function group could be justified more strongly, so that, above all, the personal benefit of these rules becomes clearer (personal attitude).

In the case of **NMA**, on the other hand, the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines is significantly influenced by the perceived behavioural control. While the personal attitude also has a significant effect on this intention, the subjective norm has a weak effect. Due to significant effects on the personal attitude, **clear and transparent rules** and the **identification with GIZ** as a federal enterprise are in principle the most important drivers for this intention. In contrast, the other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention

to work efficiently based on standardised guidelines.

> If the use of standardised guidelines shall be promoted among NMA (focusing only on the strong effects), the following could be used to influence personal attitudes:
> - rules for this function group should be formulated in a clearer and more transparent manner to highlight the personal benefit from these rules;
> - measures could be taken to increase identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise, e.g. through internal marketing.

As in the case of AMA, for **IMA** the intention to work efficiently based on standardised guidelines is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, the **availability of digital tools** is in principle the most important driver. While the other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to work efficiently based on standardised guidelines, known sources of information and a focus on standardised processes have a (strongly) negative effect on this intention.

> To promote the use of standardised guidelines among IMA (focus only on strong effects)
> - digital tools could be made available to influence perceived behaviour control, which would simplify the use of the standardised guidelines.

In contrast to all other function groups, the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines is significantly influenced by the subjective norm for **PMI**. Perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker effect. Due to very strong effects on the subjective norm and the perceived behavioural control, the **acceptance of accountability** is even the only driver for this intention that was identified in the evaluation.

> To promote the use of standardized guidelines among PMI (focus only on strong effects), then
> - measures should be taken to increase the acceptance of accountability, e.g. internal marketing to influence the subjective norm.

For **EH**, the intention to work efficiently based on standardised guidelines is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. Due to very strong effects on personal attitude and perceived behaviour control, **known sources of information**, **well-founded rules**, **identification with GIZ** and **control by the manager** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention. Strongly negative effects have been observed for a focus on standardised processes and clear and transparent rules.

> If the use of standardised guidelines shall be promoted among EH (focus only on strong effects),
> - they could be provided with an overview of where the most important information can be found in GIZ in order to influence the perceived behaviour control;
> - rules for this function group could be justified more strongly, so that above all the personal benefit from these rules becomes clearer (personal attitude);
> - measures could be taken to increase identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise, e.g. internal marketing;
> - managers could attach particular importance to checking whether EH use the guidelines or not.

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

A comparatively large number of drivers with weak effects were identified, both among employees with personnel responsibility and among employees without personnel responsibility. In both groups, the intention to work

efficiently based on standardized guidelines is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived be-
haviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. In both groups, **known
rules** and the **control by the manager** have significant effects on personal attitude and perceived behaviour
control and are therefore in principle the most important drivers for this intention. The other drivers mentioned
have a weak effect on the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines. For employees with
personnel responsibility, complex internal decision-making processes have a negative effect on this intention.
For employees without personnel responsibility, the focus on standardized processes has a negative effect on
this intention.

> To promote the use of standardised guidelines for employees with personnel responsibility (focus only on
> strong effects),
> * managers could attach particular importance to checking whether employees with personnel respon-
>   sibility use the guidelines or not;
> * measures could be taken to increase awareness of the rules, e.g. more prominent placement of im-
>   portant rules for managers to influence the perceived behaviour control.

Following rules

*At GIZ, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by whether employees see themselves as capa-
ble and feel empowered to do so.*

In terms of compliance with rules, the behaviour of most GIZ employees is influenced by all three determinants,
but mainly by the perceived behaviour control. A total of nine drivers, i.e. a comparatively large number, were
identified that influence the intention to follow rules. The most important driver for the intention to follow rules is
identification with GIZ; it is influenced by personal attitude. The other drivers appear weak; (time-consuming)
internal decision-making processes have a negative effect on the intention to follow rules through personal atti-
tude.

Differences between function groups

In contrast to the overall result, **AMA**'s intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the personal atti-
tude. The subjective norm and the perceived behaviour control have a somewhat weaker effect on this inten-
tion. Due to a very strong effect on the subjective norm, the **acceptance of accountability** is in principle the
most important driver for this intention, followed by **known rules** and **sources of information** and **identifica-
tion with GIZ**. While the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules,
time-consuming internal decision-making processes and a **focus on standardised processes** have a
negative effect on this intention.
Among **NMA**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the perceived behavioural control. The
subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to significant effects on the perceived be-
haviour control, the **acceptance of accountability** and **known rules** are in principle the most important drivers
for this intention. The other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules.
In the case of **IMA**, on the other hand, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the subjective
norm. The personal attitude and the perceived behaviour control have a somewhat weaker effect on this inten-
tion. Due to significant effects on the personal attitude and subjective norm, **identification with GIZ as a fed-
eral enterprise** is in principle the most important driver for this intention, followed by **the acceptance of ac-
countability** and **known rules**. While the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect on the intention to
follow rules, awareness of the rules among managers and a focus on standardized processes have a negative
effect on this intention.
For **PMI**, the intention to follow rules is also significantly influenced by the subjective norm; here, however, the

perceived behaviour control is equally important. Due to very strong effects on the subjective norm and perceived behaviour control, the **acceptance of responsibility** is in principle the most important driver for this intention, followed by known rules.

Among **EH**, the intention to follow rules is exclusively influenced by the perceived behaviour control. Through effects on these, **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise** is in principle the most important driver for this intention, followed by the **acceptance of accountability** and the **availability of digital tools**. Time-consuming internal decision-making processes and a focus on standardised processes have a strong negative impact on the intention to follow rules.

To promote compliance with rules among AMA, NMA, IMA, PMI and EH (focus only on strong effects), measures could be taken
- to increase the awareness of the rules and sources of information, e.g. more prominent placement of important rules (AMA, NMA, IMA)
- to increase the acceptance of accountability (AMA, NMA, IMA, PMI) and identification with GIZ (AMA, NMA, IMA), e.g. internal marketing

Differences between employees with and without personnel responsibility

Whether employees have personnel responsibility makes little difference to the importance of the behavioural determinants personal attitude and subjective norm. The perceived behaviour control is equally important for both groups.

For **employees with personnel responsibility**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude and subjective norm have a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to significant effects on all behavioural determinants, **clear and known rules** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention, followed by **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise**. While the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules, time-consuming internal decision-making processes have a negative effect on this intention. For **employees without personnel responsibility**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and the perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to significant effects on all behavioural determinants, the **acceptance of accountability** and **known** and **well-founded rules** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention, followed by **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise**. The other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules.

To encourage employees with personnel responsibility to follow rules (focusing solely on strong effects), measures could be taken
- to increase the awareness of the rules and sources of information, e.g. more prominent placement of important rules (AMA, NMA, IMA)
- to increase the identification with GIZ, e.g. internal marketing

Interpretation of the results and recommendations

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In this results section the following central questions are in focus:

- How do the cultural dimensions influence each other?
- In which areas should the differences between TARGET and ACTUAL be reduced?
- Which discrepancies are conducive and obstructive to change processes?
- Which measures should be taken and further operationalised?

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5.1 Relations between the cultural dimensions in GIZ

The following figure shows the relationships between the four cultural dimensions. It should be noted that these are correlations and not causal relationships. Accordingly, a positive correlation between two dimensions means that a positive change in one cultural dimension is accompanied by a positive change in the other dimension. However, it does not allow statements about causality. The graph shows that there is a strong and positive correlation between cooperation and creativity. There is also a strong correlation between cooperation and control (following rules). Unsurprisingly, there are also strong positive correlations between internal and external competition and the two forms of control (efficiency and following rules).


Figure 14: Relations between cultural dimensions

Furthermore, there are no counteracting effects between the dimensions of cooperation and competition or creativity and control. Thus, for example, an increase in the control dimension would not be at the expense of creative work.

5.2 Assessment or interpretation of discrepancies

The basic rule is that there is not one superior cultural expression ("one size fits all" culture). Neither one cultural dimension is better or worse or more important or less important than another. Every organizational culture has its strengths. It is important to recognize its features and to be aware of it. In business, many examples of successful companies can be found, which show very different cultural characteristics, e.g. Ford (high characteristic of the control dimension) or Apple (high characteristic of the creativity dimension). The characteristics and success of a corporate culture strongly depend on the respective environment, as companies are influenced by constraints and expectations and adapt to their framework conditions (e.g. industry, country, legal framework, etc.) by striving for legitimacy.

The results of the first online survey show medium to strong deviations in all four cultural dimensions. These deviations are not unusual - especially for large and multinational companies - and can be explained and classified very well in view of the special context of GIZ.

GIZ employees would like to see lower levels of the cultural dimensions of control and competition and higher levels of cooperation and creativity. These results confirm previous scientific findings: According to the empirical state of research, mature companies such as GIZ tend to have stronger characteristics in the dimensions of control and competition (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The above-average actual values of GIZ in control can also be explained by the accountability of a federal company. Although employees would like to see lower values in this dimension, the results of the second online survey show that employees identify with GIZ and accept the accountability obligations in principle. The evaluation team therefore sees no urgent need for action here.

The strong discrepancy between the TARGET and ACTUAL values in the dimensions cooperation and competition can be put into perspective in relation to the results of other companies. A comparison with the average values of 1000 companies shows that the ACTUAL values of GIZ are at a very similarly high level in the areas of cooperation and competition. Based on these results, there is no immediate need for action, but the wishes of the employees should be considered. Options for doing so can be found in Chapter 5 Part C. In addition, GIZ already has numerous measures in place to strengthen cooperation (e.g. Cooperation and Leadership).

In the case of creativity, GIZ even shows slightly higher values compared to the average of 1000 companies. However, since GIZ operates in a constantly changing environment, an increase in the ACTUAL value in this dimension makes sense considering the need for future adjustments and changes (see section 5.3).

5.3 Recommendations

The recommendations are intended to provide an answer to the objectives set out in the ToR of this evaluation and to derive recommendations for dealing with target-actual differences. The evaluation questions particularly emphasize the implementation of change processes. It was a concern of the evaluators to link up with ongoing processes in the company. References to relevant processes can be found in the descriptions of the recommendations. The recommendations are subdivided into a) thematic priorities and b) design of a culture-changing process. In addition to these recommendations, Chapter 4 Part C contains suggestions for measures in all four cultural dimensions for the different function groups.

a) Thematic priorities

Recommendation 1: Focus on measures in the creativity dimension that aim at changing corporate culture.

In order to successfully shape upcoming transformation projects and change processes, a corporate culture is required that is fundamentally positive towards change. Empirical research has shown that companies with a

high degree of creativity are the most open to change and can make necessary adjustments more easily. According to current scientific findings, creativity is therefore the dimension that provides the best breeding ground for innovation and change (Hartnell et al., 2011). Companies with a high value in this dimension are characterized by a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative working environment. In this environment, employees can take risks and try out new things. These companies are held together above all by their dedication to experimentation and innovation.

The evaluation team therefore recommends that measures should be taken to increase the level of creativity. As Figure 14 shows, changes in the creativity dimension are strongly positively correlated with changes in the cooperation dimension, i.e. measures to increase the level of creativity also have a positive influence on cooperation in GIZ. If changes in other cultural dimensions are also desired, related suggestions can be found in Chapter 4 Part C.

Creativity can be encouraged, but not forced. What does it mean to promote creativity as part of corporate culture? As described in Part C of Chapter 4, creativity is influenced by the personal attitude and perceived behaviour control for the majority of GIZ employees. This offers a first starting point for measures to promote creative work at GIZ: how can employees be motivated to want to work creatively? And what qualifications do they need to do so? A second starting point is provided by the identified drivers. In this context, managers are the most important factor in the overall result (see the following recommended action).

Recommendation 2: *Support managers in their role as promoters of creativity and bearers of cultural change and hold them accountable.*

A radical and short-term change in organisational culture is generally not possible, as the values, fundamental convictions, attitudes and self-image of employees cannot be changed without resistance. This is particularly true for more mature companies (such as GIZ). In more mature companies, structures, ways of thinking and behaviour have been established over the years and are thus more difficult to discontinue than, for example, in young, smaller companies.

In order to change the organisational culture of companies like GIZ in a desired direction, the behaviour patterns in the company must be addressed. As the results of the second online survey show, GIZ managers in particular have an important role to play. They can exemplify the desired behaviour and thus make it constantly visible. This way, they show which behaviour is considered correct and supported and which behaviour is not desired. This gives employees an orientation as to which behaviour is valued in the company. Thus, the "desired" behaviour spreads and shapes a "new" organisational culture.

In terms of creativity, managers also play an important role, as the results of the second online survey show. Through their leadership behaviour and style, managers can convey the values that promote creativity (cf. e.g. Nöllke, Ohly, Segler).

Thus, the topic of leadership development is of great importance in terms of promoting creativity and in change processes in general. Managers need the necessary tools to lead the change process required to achieve the desired change. In addition, managers must know, exemplify and promote the desired culture (TARGET culture) of the company. For this reason, existing training programmes (e.g. management development programme) should be reviewed accordingly and adapted if necessary. Existing peer-to-peer learning and exchange platforms could also be used to strengthen managers in their role.

Change processes always mean changes in individual values and attitudes. Not every manager may take an equally positive view of such a change. For a manager to actively support and promote a cultural change towards more creativity, he or she should ideally be a visionary person who is open to change, looks positively into the future and inspires hope for a better future in others. In addition, he or she should have a strategic orientation and strive for continuous improvement of current activities. Whether or not a GIZ leader can fulfil this role can be determined by using a tool developed by Cameron and Quinn to create a leadership competency profile (see Figure 15). The purpose of this assessment is to identify the core areas of each person's leadership competence and to check whether they are in line with the desired organisational culture. To assess this, managers must complete a four-page questionnaire (example item: "*I encourage others in my department to develop new ideas and methods*"). Based on the analysed questionnaires, a graphic overview of the leadership

competencies is then created, which in turn can be assigned to the four dimensions of the Competing Value Framework.

The aim is not to distinguish good from bad managers, but rather to find out which areas management development should focus on in the future, if the organizational culture should have a higher degree of creativity.

Figure 15: The leadership competence profile of Cameron and Quinn (2011)

Managers must also credibly demonstrate that they are wholeheartedly committed to cultural change. But they cannot show their support for future change by criticizing the past. Experience shows that this leads to more resistance and discouragement. Indeed, most employees were part of this past, and criticism degrades their past efforts and achievements and leads to demoralization (Hope and Hendry, 1995). Managers must learn how to bury past patterns of behaviour symbolically, while at the same time appreciating the past and articulating optimism for a new, successful future.

The following diagram illustrates how a change in behaviour and, in the long term, a change in culture can be initiated at GIZ by managers:

Figure 16: Change in behaviour by managers

(Source: Based on Cameron and Quinn (2011)

As the figure above shows, the members of the various management levels encounter the new (desired) behaviour patterns several times:

- 1. when they learn the behaviours;
- 2. when they apply them;
- 3. when they communicate them to their team members;
- 4. when they check the behaviour of other people.

Step 1: The top executives "learn" the new behaviours. Here it is important to win over the top management: "The board of directors is undoubtedly the most important cultural provider. He/she also shapes the rest of the organisation through his/her daily behaviour; he/she has much more influence than the HR Director or the Head of Strategy. His or her change of behaviour counts when it comes to renewing a corporate culture. Change always starts at the top. (see Schein 2011).

Step 2: The newly learned principles and behaviour patterns are applied. This step cannot be delegated. A personal change in behaviour is necessary, as otherwise the manager will lose his or her function as a role model for other employees and the desired behaviour will not be imitated.

**Step 3**: The new principles and desired behaviours are communicated to the employees. Managers should make a point of explaining to employees in detail why they should behave differently. Enough time must be allowed for this, as employees often see a change in the existing organizational culture as an "attack" on their own internalized values and attitudes.

Step 4: Managers check whether the desired behaviour patterns are also "lived" in the company. Particularly in mature companies, there is a risk that employees will fall back into their old behaviour patterns after a short time.

The importance of managers in promoting creativity in GIZ is confirmed by the current scientific discussion. Above all, it emphasises the need to sensitise and empower managers for the tasks that promote creativity. Corresponding examples from the literature regarding the promotion of creativity by managers are summarised in the following box and supplemented with an indication of which behavioural determinants of the employees of managers can be influenced by these measures.

Some recommendations from creativity research (see Nöllke, Ohly, Segler)[26]:

- **"Define" creativity**: Communicate that GIZ is not only concerned with the great successes that lead to radical changes. Useful ideas that make everyday life easier and/or enable more efficient work are also meant (Nöllke, Ohly, Segler) (→ *personal attitude*).
- **Expect and tolerate mistakes**: In order to promote creative work, a company needs a high degree of tolerance for mistakes that occur in the search for ideas. This tolerance of errors on the part of the company should be communicated to the employees and lived through the actions of the managers (Nöllke, Ohly, Segler). GIZ's error culture was already mentioned by employees as an urgent starting point in the preceding MEB and the Learning Organisation - Learning Agents (LOLA) process. (→ *personal attitude and perceived behaviour control*).
- **Creating spaces where employees can be creative**: This includes premises, but also periods of time. It takes time to develop, collect and work out ideas; nevertheless, "medium time pressure" is often recommended (Ohly) (→ *perceived behaviour control*).
- **Appreciate creativity** - **reward is secondary**: It is more important that ideas are recognized and that employees see what is happening with their ideas and/or the ideas of their colleagues.

Various studies (e.g. Ohly) have shown that reward is not an important motivating factor for creative work (see also Segler), as this evaluation for the GIZ has also shown in some cases (→ *personal attitude*).

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[26] Matthias Nöllke, 2015: Kreativitätstechniken. 7. Auflage. Haufe Verlag, Freiburg

Sandra Ohly, 2010, Wie kann man Kreativität und Innovation fördern? Psychologische Ansätze zum Ideenmanagement; Institut für Psychologie der TU Braunschweig (ppt Präsentation)

Tilman Segler (2000) Kreativitätsförderung im Unternehmen. In: Kreativität. Hrsg. Rainer M. Holm-Hadulla. Heidelberger Jahrbücher. S. 77-108. Springer Verlag.

- **Encourage creativity**: Employees should be explicitly encouraged to recognise problems and to look for solutions in the form of new ideas (Ohly, Nöllke) ($\rightarrow$ *personal attitude*).
- **Strengthen employees' own initiative and commitment:** Own initiative and commitment is seen as an important intrinsic motivating factor for creativity (e.g. Ohly, Segler). This is promoted, among other things, by opportunities for "personal development, self-determination and self-realisation (Segler, 2000: 188)", the shaping of tasks and one's own working environment and trust in the competencies of employees. This also includes giving employees more freedom to make decisions - in the second online survey this was identified as a significant driver ($\rightarrow$ *personal attitude and perceived behaviour control*).
- **Methods and techniques**: Empowering employees also includes providing them with methods and training them in the use of creativity techniques (e.g. Ohly, Segler, Nöllke) ($\rightarrow$ *perceived behaviour control*).

As the FGD has shown, there are already several programmes at GIZ for the further training of managers at various levels, which have also been positively assessed by many managers (FGD). Certainly, it would be a good idea to review the existing training courses against the background of promoting creativity and to adapt them if necessary. The principles defined in the Cooperation and Leadership process have already addressed some of the above-mentioned aspects, especially under "Live Adaptive Leadership" and "Experiment and Innovate". Other existing initiatives that try alternative approaches to leadership and collaboration or already use them in routine seem to share similar values. These include the management rooms of the GloBe division, Next Level of the AGE division or the FMB's topic and innovation forums.

b) Shaping a culture-changing process

After the previous sections have dealt with specific measures that can increase the level of creativity, recommendations are now being made that can minimise resistance to cultural change and promote the commitment of GIZ employees to new approaches. The aim of the following recommendations is to create a framework for working with all GIZ employees to
- clarify what the new cultural priorities are,
- identify what should remain unchanged in the organisation during change,
- generate specific actions that can be initiated to provide impulses for cultural change,
- identify measures for the transfer of responsibilities, and
- develop leadership competencies in order to ensure organisational effectiveness after the change[27]

The following recommendations can thus be seen as a prerequisite for the successful implementation of measures to increase the development of the creativity dimension

Recommendation 3: Communicate the discrepancies in the four cultural dimensions and emphasize the importance of the creativity dimension for future change processes.

Transparency and openness are cornerstones for the acceptance of changes in the company, and acceptance is a prerequisite for future changes in behaviour. The evaluation team recommends communicating the results of this evaluation in a broad and effective manner. One option could be, for example, an event promoted by the board to present the evaluation report, to which all GIZ employees are invited and where they are given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss together.
In order to enable as many GIZ employees as possible to participate in this event, opportunities should be provided to participate online or via video conference. The evaluation team also recommends good and attractive documentation of this event, so that employees who did not participate can also be informed. If there is a need on the part of GIZ, the evaluation team will be happy to provide inputs or information for this event.
The importance of the creativity dimension for future change processes should be emphasised (e.g. by making

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[27] Siehe dazu auch Cameron und Quinn 2011, S. 102ff.,

it an annual theme), in order to prevent the perception that measures in this dimension are arbitrary or detached from other processes. It is important for future changes in behaviour that employees can understand the measures initiated and support them. For this reason, the evaluation team also recommends the translation of the evaluation report into several languages. This was also expressed several times as a wish in the FGD.

In addition to the recommended event, the evaluation team recommends using other means of communication to demonstrate openness and transparency regarding the results, such as the IDA Community, newsletters, etc.

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Recommendation 4: *Identify stories to illustrate the desired corporate culture.*

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Corporate culture is best communicated and illustrated by stories (Martin, Feldman, Hatch and Sitkin, 1983; Martin and Powers, 1983). In other words, the values, desired orientations and principles of behaviour that are to characterise the new organisational culture are usually communicated more clearly through stories than in any other form, and thus remain better anchored in the memory.

> *At FedEx, for example, the values of customer service and punctuality are illustrated with a story in which an employee rented a helicopter to fly to a mountaintop during a snowstorm and repair a transformer that had destroyed the telephone system. In an airline, the importance of employees is described by a story in which the CEO works at the baggage carousel on holidays so that employees can take advantage of their day off.*

What employees should learn about appropriate behaviour in the "new culture" is communicated quickly and clearly by telling and retelling stories that illustrate the desired values, attributes and morals. When managers play a special role in these stories, in which they act as role models, the positive effect of the story on employee behaviour is enhanced.

The evaluation team therefore recommends identifying actual incidents or real events that illustrate the key values that are to be incorporated into the future corporate culture. These incidents or events must be linked to the company itself so that employees can identify with the values presented. In addition, these stories should be differentiated according to function and employee groups, if necessary, because "creativity" implies very different behaviours depending on the position and area of application.

In order to identify "culture-influencing" stories, the evaluation team recommends setting up a working group in which selected managers from different divisions/staff position units and departments (e.g. members of Corporate Communications and Evaluation and Corporate Strategy) come together. It is important that the stories describe a desired moral, because in principle they have the same function as an exciting and clearly formulated vision of the future. From an empirical point of view, these stories are even more effective than, for example, motivational speeches by the board of directors or well-developed strategies.

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Recommendation 5: *Develop a change architecture.*

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The evaluation team recommends the formulation of a clear goal for the culture-changing process and, based on this, the development of a change architecture. This should include alternating participatory or bottom-up phases (i.e. involving a broad circle of employees), top-down impulses and so-called "multiple nucleus actions". The change architecture should provide clarity to the participants about the objectives and the process leading to them. It should also enable those responsible to control the process with all its elements. The following elements are thus part of a change architecture: steering committee, working groups and rooms for exchange and information; in addition, objectives, activity planning and process-related monitoring of implementation.

The committees and working groups should be informed about the important behavioural determinants and drivers identified in chapter 4 Part C and about the recommendations for action listed here.

The following recommendations should be part of this change architecture. However, since the evaluators attach particular importance to these elements, they are formulated below as specific recommendations.

Recommendation 5a: *Develop a strategic action agenda.*

As part of the change architecture, the evaluation team recommends developing a strategic action agenda that describes the most important actions and behaviours to be implemented within the change processes.

For the development of this Action Agenda, it is also advisable to establish a working group, the composition of which should be determined by Corporate Unit Evaluation due to the professional proximity to this evaluation. A consensus should be reached in the working group on what should be started, what should be stopped and what more should be done to start the process of cultural change.

Empirical research on the successful implementation of culturally relevant measures shows that an action agenda should not be overloaded with too many measures. It makes more sense to concentrate on a few but important actions. For cultural change to be sustainable, it must also be reflected in the core processes in which the company operates. This means that the process of selecting employees, assessing and rewarding staff may need to be adapted to the new culture. Individual measures or, for example, simply reorganising departmental or reporting relationships alone will not contribute to long-term success. Champions must be identified who will continuously support the actions and behaviours.

Recommendation 5b: *Identify quick wins.*

Even if a long-term cultural change will only be possible with strategic measures (see above), many scientific studies (e.g. Cameron and Quinn 2011) show that so-called quick wins are elementary for the motivation to start change processes and a cultural change in general.

The evaluation team therefore recommends identifying measures that can be implemented immediately and do not take up too many resources. The rule of thumb is: 1) find something that is easy to change, 2) change it, 3) communicate it accordingly, 4) find a second thing that is easy to change, 5) change it and 6) communicate it accordingly, etc. This creates a feeling of dynamism, because employees see that something is moving in the company. This creates the impression of real progress. Since these measures are usually minor changes, there is usually not much resistance. From the point of view of the evaluation team, the subsequent communication seems to be the most important, because recognizing and highlighting each change means a victory, which in turn can generate enthusiasm and positive energies.

An example of a quick win could be the revision of the homepage contents and onboarding materials for newly hired employees. The evaluation of these materials showed that little or no attention is paid to creativity and innovation. A stronger focus on the creativity dimension in these documents and a corresponding communication of this change would be quickly realised and would send a signal both internally and externally that GIZ is striving for a cultural change towards an innovative company. The KuF principles, which are also beneficial for the implementation of the recommendations of this evaluation, should also be disseminated among employees as basic documents.

An appropriate working group should also be established to identify possible quick wins, and it must ensure that the small changes are coordinated. On the other hand, they must be targeted and consistent with the desired cultural change. There should not be no feeling of chaos, and selected initiatives should not appear arbitrary. That is why a carefully compiled list of quick wins is necessary in this phase of cultural change.

Recommendation 5c: *Tye in with ongoing culture-building initiatives.*

This link should be twofold: on the one hand, the results of the evaluation should be incorporated into existing initiatives. On the other hand, the on-going culture-relevant initiatives should inform the culture-changing process towards more creativity; in the best case, intersections can be identified, and processes integrated.

In the course of the evaluation of Corporate Culture, the Evaluation Unit had already started an exchange with existing culturally relevant initiatives and briefly outlined them. This map of initiatives should be completed and/or updated as necessary and form the basis for the implementation of this recommendation.

A further point of contact could be the MDB, which is carried out every two to three years and has so far also included questions on corporate culture. For the future monitoring of cultural perception, the MDB could be guided by the methodological approach of this evaluation in order to assess and compare changes over time.

Recommendation 6: *Consider the cultural fit in recruitment decisions*

In addition to the above recommendations, which primarily address the existing workforce, a change in culture can also be reinforced by external impulses. This includes, for example, the hiring of new employees. In the literature, the term "hiring for culture fit" is often used to refer to the cultural fit of the applicant and the company in personnel selection decisions (Bouton, 2015). It must be noted that GIZ should not strive for a supplementary fit (similarity of the applicant to existing GIZ employees), but for a complementary fit (Muchinsky and Monahan, 1987). In the complementary fit, the candidate and the company complement each other in the sense that one side has something that the other side craves (Cable and Edwards, 2004).

To find out whether an applicant has the required cultural characteristics, an assessment of the person's values and norms could be carried out based on Schwartz's theory of values (1992). Schwartz's value theory, like the Competing Values Framework, has four cultural value dimensions that are in mutual tension (see the following figure).

„**Openness to change**" (self-determination, stimulation, hedonism)	vs.	„**Conservation**" (security, tradition, conformity)
„**Self-enhancement**" (power, achievement)	*vs.*	„**Self transcendence**" (Universalism, Humanism)

Figure 17: Individual value dimensions

(Source: Following Schwartz (2012))

To achieve a complementary fit, GIZ could specifically look for applicants who show a high degree of "openness to change". These people have a set of values and norms that are in line with the desired corporate culture of GIZ. For this purpose, the applicants could fill in a three-page questionnaire within the framework of the personnel selection process. A complementary fit would be achieved if the applicants showed a high degree of "openness to change" as this corresponds to the desired target culture of creativity. In this case, the applicants possess qualities that GIZ is looking for if the company wants to achieve higher marks in the creativity dimension. A supplementary fit would be present, for example, if the applicants have a high level of proficiency in the value domain "preservation of the existing". This corresponds to the ACTUAL culture control dimension. However, a supplementary fit in this dimension is not helpful for a planned change in the ACTUAL culture. A complementary fit, on the other hand, would have a positive effect on the planned culture change.

When implementing this recommendation, it must be borne in mind that the resulting increased heterogeneity in the thinking and actions of employees may lead to more friction between them. Cooperation is likely to become more laborious and results are not necessarily achieved more quickly; however, they have the potential to be more creative due to the different perspectives and working methods that are brought in.

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Appendix

I.   Timetable of evaluation

Table 17: Timetable of evaluation

Month or week	Activity	Product / Output
July 2018	Conclusion of contract/assignment of evaluation team from Mainlevel - Como	Signed contract, order placed
August to October 2018	Interviews with managers	17 interviews with executives conducted and analysed
5 October 2018	Meeting of the reference group	
October / November 2018	First online survey	Results of the first online survey are available
10 January 2019	Meeting of the reference group	Reference group knows the results of the first online survey; further procedure coordinated with the reference group
March to April 2019	Implementation of FGD at home and abroad	Results of the FGD are available
May 2019	IDA Community	Moderated discussion in the IDA community
6 June 2019	Meeting of the reference group	Reference group knows the results of the FGD; further procedure coordinated with the reference group
July / August 2019	Second Online Survey (TPB)	Results of the second online survey are available
August to October 2019	Evaluation of the second online survey; development of recommendations; writing of the final report	
14 August 2019	Joint workshop of the evaluators and the Evaluation Unit on the results of the second online survey	Agreed interpretation of the results and next steps
13 September 2019	Meeting of the reference group to discuss the results of the second online survey	Reference group knows the results of the second online survey and has commented these
29 October 2019		Draft of final report available to the reference group
6 November 2019	Meeting of the reference group to discuss the recommendations	Recommendations commented by the reference group
12 December 2019		Final Report

II. Evaluation team

Information on the evaluation team as well as the client (board) and reference group.

Table 18: People involved in the evaluation

Name	Function	Institution/ company
Reference group		
Tanja Gönner	Speaker of the Management Board	GIZ
Dr. Roman Poeschke	Finance division	GIZ
Dr. Jochen Salow	Leader corporate unit Legal Affairs	GIZ
Florian Seger	Project manager Asia	GIZ International Services
Christopher Weisbecker	GL Sprachendienst ELVIS	GIZ
Dr. Heinz-Michael Hauser	Leader corporate unit Compliance and Integrity	GIZ
Dr. Sabine Rauer	Corporate unit Corporate Development	GIZ
Nathalie Schwendy	Human resources	GIZ
Britta Krüger	Academy for International Cooperation (AIZ)	GIZ
Birgit Geis	Sectoral department	GIZ
Dr. Petra Mutlu	Department head, South-east Asia, Pacific	GIZ
Regina Bauerochse Barbosa	Leader corporate unit	GIZ
Angela Helfer	Corporate Unit Communication Group leader Internal Communication	GIZ
Arno Tomowski	Client liasion and business development	GIZ
Louisa Lösing	Staff association	GIZ
Corporate Unit Evaluation		

Dr. Ricardo Gómez	Leader corporate unit Evaluation	GIZ
Dr. Annette Backhaus	Corporate unit Evaluation Group leader Corporate Strategic Evaluations	GIZ
Franziska Krisch	Corporate unit Evaluation Corporate Strategic Evaluations	GIZ
Christoph Mairesse	Corporate unit Evaluation Corporate Strategic Evaluations	GIZ
Evaluation team		
Dr. Felipe Isidor-Serrano	Team leader Evaluator	Mainlevel Consulting AG
Prof. Dr. Rodrigo Isidor	Evaluator	Mainlevel Consulting AG
Lukas von Petersdorff-Campen	Evaluator	Mainlevel Consulting AG
Elisabeth Hoffmann	Deputee team leader until March 2019, Evaluator	Como Consult GmbH
Julia Weinand	Deputee team leader since March 2019, Evaluator	Como Consult GmbH
Sebastian Jung	Evaluator	Como Consult GmbH
Dr. Ellen Künzel	Backstopper	Como Consult GmbH

III.   Hypotheses tested in second online survey

The following hypotheses were formulated based on the FGD and tested in the second online survey (TPB).

Cooperation:

- The workload in GIZ is high.
- In GIZ there is competition for human and financial resources.
- To be successful in GIZ, you must be visible in the company.
- I want to make a career in GIZ.
- In GIZ, there is a strong focus on standardised processes.
- In GIZ there are rules for cross-sectional cooperation.
- In my working environment there is a lot of mobile work.
- The digital tools and software available to me at GIZ are sufficient for me.
- I feel valued by GIZ.
- At GIZ, all employees have the same development opportunities.
- My manager wants me to work with other colleagues.
- Internal decision-making processes are (time) consuming.
- I can make the decisions necessary for my tasks.
- The responsibilities, interfaces between groups, departments and divisions are clearly defined.
- At GIZ cooperation is rewarded.
- Deviating departmental/divisional interests influence my work.
- In my working environment there are frequent changes of personnel.
- In my working environment there are uncertainties about continued employment at GIZ.
- I have my own networks within the company (in GIZ).

Creativity:

- The workload in GIZ is high.
- In my working environment there are uncertainties about continued employment in GIZ.
- My colleagues are striving for long-term employment.
- If I make mistakes at work, this has negative consequences for me.
- My manager wants me to be creative in my work.
- Internal decision-making processes are (time) consuming.
- Creativity is rewarded in GIZ.
- I can make the decisions necessary for my tasks.
- In my work there is a high outflow of funds.
- The institutional status of GIZ requires working according to the rules.
- My work is determined by fixed structures and procedures.
- In GIZ, all employees have the same development opportunities.
- The digital tools and software available to me at GIZ are sufficient for me.
- My colleagues in my department are very similar.

Competition:

- The workload in GIZ is high.
- In GIZ there is competition for human and financial resources.
- To be successful in GIZ, you must be visible in the company.
- I want to make a career in GIZ.
- In my working environment there are frequent changes of personnel.
- In my working environment there are uncertainties about continued employment in GIZ.
- Achieving my individual goals is my top priority.

- Team goals are part of my individual target agreement.
- In GIZ, all employees have equal development opportunities.
- High quality work is valued.
- I am committed to enhancing the reputation of GIZ.
- I strive to win the favour of partners (e.g. partner ministries, associations, etc.).
- The working conditions in GIZ are at least as good as in other organisations where I could work.

Control:

- In GIZ there is a strong focus on standardized processes.
- The rules of GIZ are clear and transparent.
- I am familiar with the rules that are important for my work.
- I know where I can find information on relevant GIZ rules.
- Internal decision-making processes (e.g. awarding processes) are (time) consuming.
- New GIZ rules are sufficiently justified.
- The digital tools/software available to me in GIZ is sufficient for me.
- My manager knows the GIZ rules.
- I identify myself with GIZ as a federal company.
- I accept the accountability of a federal enterprise.
- In my working environment there are uncertainties about continuing employment in GIZ.
- Every step of the work is controlled by my manager.
- There is a high cash outflow pressure in my work.

IV.   Regional differences in the perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture

Africa: In Africa, there are slightly fewer deviations in the perception of the TARGET and ACTUAL culture than in APLAK and EMZ. The deviations lie between 8 points (creativity) and 10 points (control). AMA in Africa have strong target-actual deviations in all cultural dimensions. NMA in Africa, on the other hand, have weak to medium target-actual deviations and differ significantly from AMA in this respect. Southern Africa shows somewhat stronger differences compared to the overall result: the deviations here are between 11 points (creativity and competition) and 14 points (control). The ACTUAL value of the cultural dimension control is highest here worldwide, especially for NMA in this region (ACTUAL=41; total ACTUAL=33).

Asia: In Asia, there are medium to large ACTUAL differences in all cultural dimensions. Here the deviations range between 9 points (competition) and 11 points (cooperation and control). In this region, AMA show significantly greater deviations than NMA. Within Asia, the greatest deviations in ACTUAL-TARGET values are found in East Asia (11 points for creativity and competition; 13 points for cooperation and control). The ACTUAL value for the cultural dimension control is also highest here. In East Asia, the deviations are particularly strong for AMA, ranging between 12 points (competition) and 16 points (control).

Latin America: In Latin America, the deviations between ACTUAL and TARGET are medium to strong in all cultural domains. They range from 8 points for competition to 11 points for control. AMA also show larger deviations than NMA in this region, but the differences between these groups are smaller than in other regions. While cooperation shows the smallest discrepancy among AMA (7 points), this is the cultural dimension with the largest deviation between TARGET and ACTUAL among NMA (12 points).

EMZ: In the region EMZ the discrepancies are slightly higher and range from 10 points (creativity and control) to 12 points (cooperation and competition). AMA in this region have strong ACTUAL-TARGET differences in all cultural dimensions (between 11 points for competition and 13 points for creativity and control). Overall, NMA in this region show lower deviations than AMA, but at the same time they vary greatly depending on the cultural dimension: Only 4 points for competition (here the ACTUAL value is comparatively low and the TARGET value comparatively high) and 12 points for cooperation.

V.   Influencing factors and drivers in the various regions

Differences between regions in the cooperation dimension

There are no regional differences in the importance of behavioural determinants: in all regions, personal attitudes have a strong impact and the perceived behavioural control is indicative of the intention to cooperate. Across the regions, managers are the strongest driver. They have at least a significant influence over perceived behavioural control and a significant effect over personal attitude.

In **Africa**, the **focus on standardized processes** is the second strongest driver, which also has an effect over both behavioural determinants, albeit somewhat weaker. Career aspirations, appreciation, clear responsibilities and interfaces, and rewards have a weak influence.

In the **Asia, Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean region**, no driver with a very strong effect could be identified, but five drivers with a significant effect. Managers as the strongest driver are followed by career aspirations, which also influence both behavioural determinants, but somewhat weaker. Other important drivers are focus on standardized processes and own networks (both via personal attitude) and appreciation (via perceived behavioural control). Deviating departmental/ divisional interests have a negative effect on personal attitudes in the region.

No very strong effects were identified in **the Europe, Mediterranean and Central Asia region** either. In this region, **appreciation** has the second strongest influence; the driver also acts via both behavioural determinants, but to a lesser extent than managers. Weak effects have a focus on standardized processes, digital tools/software and freedom of choice; they all work through perceived behavioural control.

With regard to the importance of the behavioural determinants, it makes no difference whether employees work in **non-fragile or fragile states**. The intention to work together is significantly influenced by the personal attitude. Perceived behavioural control has a somewhat weaker influence on the intention to cooperate. Due to significant effects on personal attitudes and perceived behavioural control, **leadership** and **appreciation** in both groups are in principle the most important drivers for cooperation. In fragile states, **career aspirations** play an equally important role. Standardized processes and decision-making freedom have a weak influence on cooperation in both groups. Weak drivers in non-fragile states are a high workload and rewards, in fragile states the availability of digital tools.

Differences between regions in the dimension of internal competition

No regional differences in the behavioural determinants could be found - they correspond to the overall result. The regions are very similar in terms of the strongest drivers; Africa is the only exception. However, differences can be seen in the drivers that are second or third strongest, etc.

In **Africa**, **team goals** have the strongest (significant) effect on the intention to compete with colleagues. Individual objectives and equal development opportunities, i.e. the two strongest drivers in the overall result, have only a weak effect here; the same applies to visibility.

In **Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean**, **equal development opportunities** have the strongest effect on internal competitive behaviour, followed by **career aspirations** and **individual goals**. Competition for resources has weak effects.

In Europe, the Mediterranean and Central Asia, **equal development opportunities** are also the most important driver, again followed by **career aspirations** and **individual goals**. Competition for resources also plays an important role.

In terms of behavioural determinants, it makes no difference whether employees work in fragile or non-fragile states. In both contexts, the intention to compete with colleagues is significantly influenced by personal attitude and subjective norms. Perceived behaviour control influences this intention somewhat less. Due to significant effects on the personal attitude and subjective norm, **equal development opportunities** in **fragile states** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention. While there are only weak effects of the other drivers on the intention to compete with colleagues, appreciation leads to a reduction of competitive behaviour.

Even in **non-fragile countries**, **equal development opportunities** are in principle the most important drivers

for this intention. Here, however, **competition for financial and human resources** also has a significant effect on internal competitive behaviour. The two groups also differ regarding other drivers which have only a weak effect. Even in non-fragile countries, visibility is a driver that leads to less competition.

Differences between regions in the external competition dimension

In Africa, **individual targets** are the strongest driver for the intention to compete with other organisations. They have a significant impact through personal attitude, subjective norms and a weak impact through perceived behavioural control. Weak effects have competition for resources and team goals.

The other two regions differ from Africa, where career aspirations are the most important drivers. In APLAK, **career aspirations** have a very strong effect on personal attitude and significant effects on subjective norm and perceived behaviour control. The **favour of partners** has a significant effect on perceived behaviour control and a weak effect on the two other determinants of behaviour. Weak effects have team goals, good working conditions and uncertainty about continued employment.

In EMZ there are two drivers that are equally important for the intention to compete with other organizations. Both **career aspirations** and **equal development opportunities** have a significant effect on personal attitude and perceived behaviour control and a weak effect on subjective norms. Efforts to enhance the reputation of GIZ appear weak; a high workload in turn has a negative effect (personal attitude).

In **fragile states**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organisations is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and by perceived behaviour control. Of the drivers examined, none with strong or significant effects could be identified; however, five of the drivers show weak effects on the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations. **Appreciation of high-quality work** lowers the intention to compete with external competitors.

In **non-fragile staes**, the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. Due to significant effects on all behavioural determinants, personal **career aspirations** are the most important driver for this intention, followed by **equal development opportunities**. While these drivers only have weak effects on the intention to compete with other (donor) organizations, good working conditions have a negative impact on this intention.

Differences between regions in the creativity dimension

Comparing the regions, there are no differences in the behavioural determinants, all of which correspond to the overall result.

In **fragile states**, the intention to work creatively is influenced by personal attitudes and perceived behaviour control. Through significant effects on personal attitudes and perceived behaviour control, **managers** are in principle the most important driver for creative work. Weak effects are found in the availability of digital tools and the freedom to make one's own decisions. In **non-fragile countries**, the intention to work creatively is also influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. With a very strong effect on perceived behaviour control, **managers** are in principle the most important driver for creative work, followed by **freedom of choice**. **Equal development opportunities for all employees** and **high workloads** even have a negative effect on the intention to work creatively.

When comparing the regions Africa, APLAK and EMZ, the differences relate to the importance of managers as drivers: Although the effect on the subjective norm is significant in all regions, the additional effect on perceived behaviour control is even stronger in Africa than in other regions. In the APLAK region, freedom of decision has no influence on the intention to work creatively; in Africa and EMZ, the influence is significant. On the other hand, the availability of digital tools and software in APLAK is significant and has no influence in the other two regions. APLAK is also the only region where the expectation of negative consequences of errors and (time-consuming) decision-making processes impair creative action. The EMZ region also differs from the other two regions in terms of the importance of **high workload**: This has a negative impact on whether employees develop the intention to work creatively.

Differences between regions in the "working efficiently" dimension

Fragile and non-fragile states differ only slightly in terms of the determinants of behaviour. In both categories, the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines is significantly influenced by personal attitudes and perceived behaviour control. In fragile states the subjective norm has a weak effect on this intention, and in non-fragile states it has a significant effect.

Due to significant effects on personal attitudes and perceived behaviour control, **known and established rules** and **managerial control** in **fragile states** are in principle the most important drivers for this intention. However, the other drivers mentioned above have a weak effect on this intention. In **non-fragile states**, clear and established rules are in principle the most important driver for this intention through a significant effect on perceived behaviour control. While the other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to work efficiently based on standardized guidelines, the **focus on standardized processes** has a **negative** effect.

No differences in the importance of the behavioural determinants: In all regions the personal attitude and the perceived behaviour control have a very strong and the subjective norm a significant effect on the intention to work creatively.

Africa: Nine out of 13 drivers have a weak effect on the intention to work creatively, one of them is **negative (internal decision-making processes)**. Of the weak effects, the **availability of digital tools/software** is the most significant, as it works through both personal attitude and perceived behaviour control.

Also, in **APLAK** the number of drivers is quite high (seven), but only two of them have weak effects**. Rules are justified** is the most important driver for the APLAK region; it works very strongly through personal attitude. It is followed by **control by the manager** with significant effects on all three behavioural determinants. Also significant are the **availability of digital tools and software** (perceived behaviour control), **identification with GIZ** (personal attitude) and **rules known to the manager** (subjective norm).

In the **EMZ** region, **well-founded rules** are the most important driver with significant effects on personal attitude and subjective norm. Other drivers have only a weak effect. The **focus on standardized processes** has a **negative** effect on the intention to work creatively (personal attitude).

Differences between regions in the 'follow rules' dimension

The Africa, APLAK and EMZ regions do not differ in the importance of the determinants of behaviour. As in the overall result, the perceived behaviour control has a very strong effect on the intention to follow rules, the personal attitude and the subjective norm. As in the efficiency sub-dimension, there are comparatively many drivers in all regions that have at least a weak effect on intention.

In **Africa**, **identification with GIZ** is the most important driver for the intention to follow rules; it has a strong effect via personal attitude and a weak effect via perceived behaviour control. The **availability of digital tools/software** (personal attitude and perceived behaviour control), **rules are clear and transparent** (personal attitude and perceived behaviour control) and **rules are known to the manager** (subjective norm) are important drivers. Another four drivers appear weak via perceived behaviour control, one via personal attitude.

In **APLAK**, **acceptance of accountability** of GIZ and **known rules** are the strongest drivers for the intention to follow rules. They act very strongly through perceived behaviour control and weakly through personal attitude or very strongly through the subjective norm, significantly through perceived behaviour control and weakly through personal attitude. However, **availability of digital tools / software** (perceived behaviour control and personal attitude), **well-founded rules** (personal attitude and perceived behaviour control)**, rules are known to the manager** (subjective norm) and **identification with the GIZ** (personal attitude) have significant effects. If **internal decision-making processes are perceived as (time) consuming**, this has **negative** effects on the intention to work efficiently via personal attitude and perceived behaviour control.

In the disaggregation of the results by fragile and nonfragile countries, differences are apparent in both behavioural determinants and drivers. In **fragile states**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by personal attitudes and perceived behaviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to significant effects on perceived behaviour control and personal attitude, **identification with GIZ** as a federal enterprise and **acceptance of accountability** are the most important drivers of intention. The

other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules. In **non-fragile states**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise** is also the most important driver for this intention. While the other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules, **elaborate internal decision-making processes** and the **focus on standardised processes** have a **negative** effect on this intention

In the **EMZ** region, there are also a whole range of drivers. The strongest influence by the **awareness of rules**: impacts very strong on perceived behaviour control and weak on personal attitude. Other important drivers are that **rules are clear and transparent** (about all three behavioural determinants, most strongly about perceived behaviour control), **identification with the GIZ** (personal attitude and subjective norm) and **rules are well-founded** (personal attitude). The **focus on standardised processes** as well as **(time-consuming) internal decision-making processes** have **negative** effects on the intention to work efficiently (both via personal attitude).

In the disaggregation of the results according to fragile and non-fragile states, differences can be seen both in behavioural determinants and drivers. In **fragile countries** the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by personal attitude and perceived behaviour control. The subjective norm has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to significant effects on perceived behaviour control and personal attitude, **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise** and **acceptance of accountability** are the most important drivers. The other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules. In **non-fragile states**, the intention to follow rules is significantly influenced by the subjective norm and perceived behaviour control. The personal attitude has a somewhat weaker effect on this intention. Due to a significant effect on the personal attitude, **identification with GIZ as a federal enterprise** is also the most important driver for this intention. While the other drivers mentioned have a weak effect on the intention to follow rules, **elaborate internal decision-making processes** and the **focus on standardised processes** have a **negative** effect on this intention.

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